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INTRODUCTION  
 
 The financial crisis prompted in the United States unprecedented 
government bailouts for banks, mortgage servicers, the insurance giant 
AIG, and automotive makers General Motors and Chrysler.1  The U.S. 
economy shifted to financial services and products, and more behavioral 
regulation is underway for financial institutions deemed too-big-to-fail.  But 
federal regulators were incapable in addressing the abuses leading up to the 
financial crisis, unaware initially of the scope of the crisis, and inept in their 
initial response.2  This is troubling especially when the U.S. Supreme Court, 
of late, appears more comfortable with the antitrust function being 
subsumed in the regulatory framework.3 
 Although one can distinguish the financial services industry from other 
industries, the crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak 
regulation, the lack of understanding of systemic risk in financial markets, 
and moral hazard.  Policymakers are re-examining fundamental issues such 
as the efficiency of markets4 and the role of legal, social, and ethical norms 
                                                 
1
 ProPublica, Bailout Recipients, http://bailout.propublica.org/main/list/index. 
2
 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY (2010). 
3
 Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkline Communications, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109, 1124 
(2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (when a “regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy 
anticompetitive harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the 
benefits”); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2395 (2007); 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414-15 
(2004); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The 
American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 636 (2010); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009). 
4
 Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.  
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous Antitrust 
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in a market economy.5  The financial crisis has prompted calls for 
reinvigorating antitrust enforcement in the U.S., toughening antitrust’s legal 
standards,6 and breaking up firms deemed too big to fail.7   
 In reconsidering their antitrust policies, policymakers should return to 
first principles.  Antitrust policy is built on a flawed assumption of 
rationality.  As a result, antitrust provides an incomplete, and at times 
incorrect, account of competition.  For the past thirty years, the Chicago,8 
post-Chicago,9 and to the extent distinguishable, Harvard Schools10 have 
debated over antitrust’s legal standards.  But all three schools assume a 
                                                                                                                            
Enforcement in This Challenging Era (May 12, 2009) (rejecting assumption that markets 
are generally self-policing and self-correcting), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm; J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Conference on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: Managing 
Irrationality: Some Observations on Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Jan. 6, 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100106financial-products.pdf. 
5
 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at xvi, 238-74; GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. 
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS:  HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY 
IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 26 (2009); ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE 
RETURN OF THE MASTER 189 (2009); Gillian Tett, The Emotional Markets Hypothesis and 
Greek Bonds, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 10-11, 2010, at 7; Rana Foroohar, May the Best Theory 
Win: How Economists Are Competing to Make Sense of Our Failed Financial System, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 2010 (discussing annual meeting of American Economic Association); 
John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Markets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 9; Paul 
Krugman, How Did Economists Get it So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009 (Sun. Mag.), 
at 36. 
6
 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on 
Antitrust Monopoly Law: Antitrust Division to Apply More Rigorous Standard With Focus 
on the Impact of Exclusionary Conduct on Consumers (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm. 
7
 See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET 
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 208-22 (2010). 
8
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). 
9
 See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 113, at 134 (2d ed. 2000) 
(“Business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximizers”); Herbert J. 
Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review & Critique, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 259 
(2001); Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445-695 (1995). 
10
 William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct:  The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
101 (summarizing contributions of Harvard School to modern antitrust analysis). 
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marketplace of rational11 profit-maximizing firms and consumers with 
perfect willpower.12  Therein lies the problem. 
 For meaningful change after the financial crisis, competition 
policymakers must reconsider three fundamental interrelated questions:  
First, what is competition?  Second, what are the goals of the competition 
laws?  Third, what should be the legal standards to promote these goals?  
This Article addresses the first question, What is competition.  The 
question seems so basic that it need not be asked.  But as Part I discusses, 
no satisfactory definition of competition exists.  Some consider competition 
as an idealized end state (such as static price competition under the 
economic model of perfect competition).  Others view competition as a 
dynamic process. 
Part II explores one reason why multiple definitions of competition 
remain.  Any theory of competition depends on its premises, the validity of 
which may not hold true across industries, countries, and time.  Using the 
recent developments from behavioral economics, Part II varies one premise 
of competition--the relative rationality of market firms and consumers.  As 
the behavioral economic literature has shown over the past thirty years, and 
the recent financial crisis bore out, consumers and firms do not always 
behave rationally.  Relaxing the assumption of rational firms and consumers 
yields four scenarios of competition.   
Part III analyzes each scenario of competition and its policy 
                                                 
11
 Rationality under neoclassical economic theory has a narrow meaning, namely 
individuals are objective, seek out the optimal amount of information, readily and 
continually update their prior factual beliefs with relevant and reliable empirical data, and 
choose, after conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the best action according to stable, well-
defined preferences.  Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1214-15 
(2003).  Rationality, as discussed herein, does not encompass its other meanings, such as 
being fair, pragmatic, thoughtful, compassionate, or virtuous. 
12
 Humans with perfect willpower take actions that are consistent with their own long-
term interests. 
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implications.  In relaxing the assumption of rational firms and consumers, 
the theory of competition extends beyond the current focus on static price 
competition in narrowly defined markets.  Issues of systemic risk, 
behavioral exploitation, herding behavior, overconfidence bias, the 
importance of maintaining trial-and-error feedback loops, consumer choice, 
and competitive diversity all increase in importance.  Moreover for each 
scenario of competition, Part III separately examines the antitrust policy 
implications if the government is relatively less or more rational than 
market participants.  This Article introduces several important challenges 
facing competition policy and provides several mechanisms for competition 
agencies to improve their policies. 
I. DEFINING COMPETITION 
A.  Common Definitions of Competition 
One popular antitrust treatise states, “Today it seems clear that the 
general goal of the antitrust laws is to promote ‘competition’ as the 
economist understands that term.”13  One problem, the treatise recognizes, 
is that economists can have a different conception of competition than 
lawyers and laypersons.14  Another problem is that economists have not 
reached consensus in defining competition. 
The United States’ Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted over a century 
ago.15  But antitrust law, Robert Bork observed, “has not arrived at one 
satisfactory definition of ‘competition.’”16  This is surprising.  The concept 
of competition is central to competition policy and economic thinking in 
                                                 
13
 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, I ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION & 100a, at 4 (3d ed. 2006); see also 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT ON ANTITRUST 
POLICY OBJECTIVES (2003), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
comments/2003/reports/policyobjectives.pdf. 
14
 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at & 100a, at 3. 
15
 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
16
 BORK, supra note 8, at 61 (1993). 
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general.  Competition law focuses on anti-competitive restraints,17 and one 
oft-described goal is to ensure an effective competitive process.18  Yet the 
concept of competition, economist John Vickers said, “has taken on a 
number of interpretations and meanings, many of them vague.”19  Others 
agree.20  Most jurisdictions “maintain that their competition laws ‘preserve 
competition,’” observed the American Bar Association, but preserving 
                                                 
17
 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-
99 (2007) (noting how courts can “devise rules over time for offering proof, or even 
presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit 
anticompetitive restraints  and to promote procompetitive ones”). 
18
 Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Int'l Competition Network, Report on the 
Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market 
Power, and State-Created Monopolies 6 (2007), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/Objectiv
es%20of%CC20Unilateral%CC20Conduct%CC20May%2007.pdf  [hereinafter 2007 ICN 
Report]. 
19
 John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 3 (1995).  
20
 United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) 
(“There is no one definition of competition. Economists do not agree over the meaning of 
the term nor do they agree how it can be achieved.”); WORLD BANK, WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 140 (2002), 
available at http:// www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fulltext2002.htm (finding in its 
survey of fifty countries’ competition laws, “different conceptions of competition . . . 
across countries”); Neri Salvadori & Rodolfo Signorino, The Classical Notion of 
Competition Revisited, MPRA Paper No. 22499 2 (May 5, 2010), http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/22499/ (noting that few would disagree with Vickers’ statement); Michael E. 
Porter, Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Business 
Competitive Index 2004, in UNIQUE VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION 
CREATING UNIQUE VALUE 64 (Charles D. Weller Ed. 2004) (competitiveness “remains a 
concept that is not well understood, despite widespread acceptance of its importance”); 
Donghyun Park, The Meaning of Competition: A Graphical Exposition, 29 J. ECON. EDUC. 
347, 356 (1998) (“competition has become one of the most ambiguous concepts in 
economics”); Jay B. Barney, Types of Competition and the Theory of Strategy: Toward an 
Integrative Framework, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 791, 798 (1986) (“Competition . . . is a 
concept that can mean different things at different times to different firms.”); Michael S. 
Lewis-Beck, Maintaining Economic Competition: The Causes and Consequences of 
Antitrust, 41 J. POL. 169, 171 (1979) (noting the “lack, among economists, of a generally 
accepted definition of competition”); Paul J. McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning 
of Competition, 82 Q. J. ECON. 639, 639 (1968) (“probably no concept in all of economics 
that is at once more fundamental and pervasive, yet less satisfactorily developed, than the 
concept of competition”); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically 
Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1957) (noting that concept of competition was long 
treated with casualness); STANLEY N. BARNES ET AL., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 318 (1955) (“idea of competition 
itself . . . is not so easy to define”). 
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competition “does not always mean the same thing in different jurisdictions 
and is sometimes only one of several objectives pursued under a country’s 
antitrust law.”21  The Chilean Competition Tribunal, for example, said, “the 
only objective of competition policy is to promote and protect competition,” 
but then recognized that “one of the main difficulties is to define legally 
what ‘free competition means,’ or to articulate why competition itself 
should be protected.”22 
Some view competition in its natural setting, a cutthroat fight over 
scarce resources.23  But within animal ecology, genetics, and evolution, the 
term competition has multiple meanings.24  Antitrust policy, of course, does 
not encourage market participants in seeking scarce resources to maim or 
kill others.25  Competition should not increase society’s mortality rate.26  
Even within the animal kingdom, competition for scarce resources is not a 
prerequisite for “survival of the fittest,” the natural selection of species.27   
Many view competition as rivalry:  “the effort of two or more parties 
acting independently to secure the business of a third party by offering the 
most favorable terms.”28  Several courts applied similar definitions, such as  
                                                 
21
 American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Report on Antitrust Policy 
Objectives (Feb. 12, 2003) http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
comments/2003/reports/policyobjectives.pdf. 
22
  2007 ICN Report, supra note 18, at 8.  In 2004, when Chile's competition act was 
amended, “the executive and legislative powers discussed whether ‘free competition’ 
should be defined more narrowly as a right to participate in economic activities, a means of 
promoting economic efficiency, or a means of enhancing consumer welfare.” The 
legislators, as reported by the ICN, “decided that the meaning of ‘free competition,’ that is, 
an effective competitive process, should be left to the Tribunal's interpretation, on a case-
by-case basis.” Id. 
23
 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that “cutthroat competition” is a term of praise rather than condemnation and 
consumers gain when firms try to “kill” the competition and take as much business as they 
can). 
24
 LC Birch, The Meaning of Competition, 91 AM. NATURALIST 5, 6 (1957). 
25
 Id. at 6. 
26
 Id. at 9. 
27
 Id. at 13. 
28
 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/competition; BARNES ET AL., supra 
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• the “effort of two or more parties, acting independently, to 
secure the custom of a third party by the offer of the most 
favorable terms.' ‘The struggle between rivals for the same trade 
at the same time.”29; and  
• the “independent endeavor of two or more persons or 
organizations within the realm of a chosen market place, to 
obtain the business patronage of others by means of various 
appeals, including the offer of more attractive terms or superior 
merchandise.”30 
Others question this characterization of competition.  Increasing the 
number of rivals does not necessarily increase, and can diminish, incentives 
to compete.31  “An economist sees competition not in terms of rivalry per 
se, but in terms of market performance,” said a former DOJ official. “An 
economist would say that a market is perfectly competitive when firms 
price their output at marginal cost and costs are minimized by internal 
efficiency. This does not necessarily require a large number of rivals. 
Where entry and exit are costless, markets can be perfectly competitive 
even with only one firm serving the entire market.”32  He characterized 
competition as “the process by which market forces operate freely to assure 
that society's scarce resources are employed as efficiently as possible to 
                                                                                                                            
note 20, at 318 (one conception of competition is “the self-interested and independent 
rivalry of two or more private competitors”). 
29
 Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d 265, 270 (1st Cir. 1937). 
30
 United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 
1950); see also New England Theatres, Inc. v. Lausier, 86 F. Supp. 852, 856 (D. Me. 
1949); United States v. Sutherland, 9 F. Supp. 204, 205 (W.D. Mo. 1934). 
31
 Avishalom Tor & Stephen M. Garcia, The N-Effect: Beyond Winning Probabilities, 
PSYCHOL. SCI. (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502856. 
32
 William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, What Is Competition? Seminar on Convergence sponsored by the Netherlands 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (October 28, 2002) 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm#N_7_. 
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maximize total economic welfare.”33   
Competition, like athletic contests,34 is not always zero-sum.  It involves 
cooperation through voluntary endeavors among suppliers, wholesalers, 
retailers, and consumers.  One can view competition as the voluntary 
process society elects to resolve conflicts of interest among its members.35 
Competition can be vertical among firms in the distribution chain.  
Manufacturers often have a complementary and competitive relationship 
with firms from whom they buy and to whom they sell.36  Not surprisingly, 
two of Harvard Business Professor Michael Porter’s famous five 
competitive forces that impact a company’s profits are vertical:  (i) 
powerful customers seeking to “capture more value by forcing down prices, 
demanding better quality or more service (thereby driving up costs), and 
generally playing industry participants off against one another, all at the 
expense of industry profitability” and (ii) powerful suppliers seeking to 
“capture more of the value for themselves by charging higher prices, 
limiting quality or services, or shifting costs to industry participants.”37 
Competition is also normative.38  What we observe as competition 
reflects in part the constraints and incentives imposed by the government 
                                                 
33
 Id.  
34
 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (NCAA), 468 
U.S. 85 (1984). 
35
 ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 127 (1977). 
36
 Robert L. Steiner, Market Power in Consumer Goods Industries, in PRIVATE 
LABELS, BRANDS, AND COMPETITION POLICY:  THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RETAIL 
COMPETITION (2009); Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (C 31/03) ' V 
(2004) (“competitive pressure on a supplier is not only exercised by competitors but can 
also come from its customers”) 
37
 Michael E. Porter, The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan. 2008; Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
38
 Xiaoye Wang, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in 
Progress, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 579, 580 (2009) (observing how China until the late 1970s 
viewed the term competition pejoratively as a “capitalist monster”). 
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and society through informal social, ethical and moral norms.39  Societies 
distinguish between “competition on the merits” and unfair methods of 
competition.40  Those terms, subject to different interpretations,41 imply that 
competition can be good or bad, based on society’s “generalized standards 
of fairness and social utility.”42  Market participants through the legislature, 
industry codes, and informal norms set the rules and punishments.  At times 
competition is considered “ruinous” or “cutthroat.”43  At times competition 
with foreign firms is criticized as “structurally and qualitatively unequal.”44 
At times competition is curtailed to promote other societal goals.45 
Nor is competition always desirable.  Status competition (including 
                                                 
39
 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 60, 
123 (2005). 
40
 Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ' 45(a) (prohibiting 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”); Article 6 of Rome II 
(Unfair competition and acts restricting free competition); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson 
Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (“unfair competitive practices were not limited to those 
likely to have anticompetitive consequences after the manner of the antitrust laws; nor were 
unfair practices in commerce confined to purely competitive behavior”). 
41
 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Policy Brief: What Is Competition on the 
Merits? 1 (2006), http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/27/37082099.pdf (noting that 
expression “competition on the merits” has “never been satisfactorily defined,” which has 
“led to a discordant body of case law that uses an assortment of analytical methods,” which 
in turn has “produced unpredictable results and undermined the term's legitimacy along 
with policies that are supposedly based on it”). 
42
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION ' 1, at 9 (1995). 
43
 Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by 
R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal 
and Enterprise Affairs, OECD (1993) (“refers to situations when competition results in 
prices that do not chronically or for extended periods of time cover costs of production, 
particularly fixed costs. This may arise in secularly declining or ‘sick’ industries with high 
levels of excess capacity or where frequent cyclical or random demand downturns are 
experienced.”), http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3186. 
44
 JAMES KYNGE, CHINA SHAKES THE WORLD: A TITAN'S RISE AND TROUBLED FUTURE 
-- AND THE CHALLENGE FOR AMERICA 109 (2007) (concerns over China’s currency being 
undervalued, and keeping costs artificially low with poor safety, environmental and worker 
standards, and by subsidizing energy and water). 
45
 United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 301 (1945) (“If a State for its 
own sufficient reasons deems it a desirable policy to standardize the price of liquor within 
its borders either by a direct price-fixing statute or by permissive sanction of such price-
fixing in order to discourage the temptations of cheap liquor due to cutthroat competition, 
the Twenty-first Amendment gives it that power and the Commerce Clause does not 
gainsay it.”). 
16-Sep-11 RECONSIDERING COMPETITION 11 
competing over conspicuous consumption) can increase envy and misery.46  
As economist Richard Layard observed, 
We do want the maximum of competition between firms, but not 
between individuals. We want a lot of cooperation between individuals, 
for one reason above all – that life is more enjoyable that way.47 
  
When referring positively to competition, policymakers often cite its 
effects, such as “low prices, high quality products, a wide selection of goods 
and services, and innovation.”48  But the effects do not define competition 
itself.  The effects, at times, are inconsistent.  Higher prices and reduced 
output, remarked the Supreme Court, are “the paradigmatic examples of 
restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.”49  But a 
divided Court recently recognized that vertical restraints that lead to higher 
prices can nonetheless be pro-competitive.50  Manufacturers today can 
prevent retailers–through resale price maintenance–from discounting their 
goods. At times, increased price competition (for example, intra-brand 
competition51) leads to more free-riding, less services and innovation, and 
                                                 
46
 Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want? Competition Policy & the Role of 
Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893 (2010). 
47
 Richard Layard, Happiness & Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession, 116 
ECON. J. C24, C31 (2006). 
48
 European Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(2008/C 265/07); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) 
(“unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our 
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material 
progress”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer (“Free and 
open competition benefits consumers by ensuring lower prices and new and better 
products”), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm; Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Competition Counts: How Consumers Win When Businesses Compete (“Competition in 
America is about price, selection, and service. It benefits consumers by keeping prices low 
and the quality and choice of goods and services high.”), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/edu/pubs/consumer/general/zgen01.pdf. 
49
 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
107–08 (1984). 
50
 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
51
 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). A vertical non-
price restraint can potentially and simultaneously reduce intra-brand competition (e.g., 
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ultimately fewer choices and firms.52  At times, greater innovation comes 
from excluding competitors from making, using, or selling the product at a 
lower price.53 
B.  Perfect v. Dynamic Competition 
Within antitrust, two popular theories of competition are as (i) an ideal 
static end-state (perfect competition) and (ii) a process (dynamic 
competition).54  Perfect competition, according to some, is “the most 
competitive market imaginable in which everybody is a price taker.”55  In 
the perfectly competitive market, “buyers and sellers are so numerous and 
well informed that each can act as a price-taker, able to buy or sell any 
desired quantity without affecting the market price.”56  Between monopoly 
and perfect competition are degrees of imperfect competition.57 
                                                                                                                            
competition among Sylvania dealers for Sylvania television sets) and stimulate inter-brand 
competition (e.g., competition among different manufacturers of television sets, such as 
Zenith or RCA).  
52
 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007); Louis D. 
Brandeis, Price and Competition, in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE 
BRANDEIS 398 (1930) (observing how unrestricted competition leads to monopoly); Peter 
O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability Competition in Radio 
Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 212-17 (1952); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation 
and Competition 34 (Apr. 17, 2007) (discussing winner-take-all standards war where firms 
vigorously compete to establish their technology as the de facto standard), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.htm. 
53
 H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (copyright law considers “how much the 
monopoly granted [would] be detrimental to the public . . . [as] the granting of such 
exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public 
that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly”); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 
55, 63 (1998) (“The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and 
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the 
interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has been 
a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.”). 
54
 Mark Blaug, Is Competition Such a Good Thing? Static Efficiency versus Dynamic 
Efficiency, 19 REV. INDUS. ORG. 37, 37 (2001) (noting distinction goes to early history of 
economics). 
55http://www.economist.com/RESEARCH/ECONOMICS/alphabetic.cfm?letter=C#co
mpetition.  
56
 JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 348 (1997); William J. Kolasky, What 
Is Competition? A Comparison of U.S. and European Perspectives, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 
29, 31 (2004). 
57
 F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
16-Sep-11 RECONSIDERING COMPETITION 13 
Others, like F.A. Hayek, dispute this characterization of competition.58 
Competition by its nature is not an end state but a dynamic process.  The 
competitive process is complex and unpredictable.  The imperfections and 
limitations of human knowledge and the variety of conditions intrinsic to or 
affecting markets (including legal, social and ethical norms, technology, 
production, and service norms) necessitate against a stable competitive end 
state.  
The 2010 revisions to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines exposed 
the divide between static price competition and competition as a dynamic 
process.59  The 2010 Guidelines are an improvement over the earlier 
Guidelines in recognizing other non-price dimensions of competition.60  But 
the criticism remains that the 2010 Guidelines primarily focus on static 
competition in narrowly-defined antitrust markets.61 Thus one complaint 
endures:  Competition officials recognize the importance of dynamic 
competition for our nation’s long-term economic growth,62 but antitrust law 
                                                                                                                            
PERFORMANCE 16-18 (3d ed. 1990). 
58
 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948); see also 2007 
ICN Report, supra note 18, at 28 (noting that 10 of 32 surveyed competition agencies 
focused on fostering a competitive process that is dynamic in nature). 
59
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.  
60
 Compare id. at ' 1 (discussing throughout how market power can be manifested in 
“non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product 
quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation”) with U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 n.6 (1992, 
revised 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 (relegating non-price 
competition to one footnote: “Sellers with market power also may lessen competition on 
dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service, or innovation.”). 
61
 See, e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Next Challenges for 
Antitrust Economists (July 8, 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100708neraspeech.pdf; Jay Ezrielev & Janusz A. 
Ordover, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:  A Static Compass in a Dynamic 
World?, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2010). 
62
 Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Competition Enforcement in an Innovative Economy, (June 20, 2008) (quoting 
Robert M. Solow, Growth Theory and After, Prize Lecture for the Sveriges Riksbank Prize 
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1987 (Dec. 8, 1987), 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/solow-lecture.html). 
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has ossified around static price competition.63 
Consequently, competition is ubiquitous and can take different forms.  
Market participants compete to secure greater monetary profits.  Sycophants 
in authoritarian regimes compete to curry favor with superiors.  Thus the 
issue is not whether competition exists, but “what kind of competition 
should exist.”64  Competition can occur (i) on various dimensions (such as 
price, quality, service, variety, innovation) across markets (ii) operating at 
different levels of efficiency (iii) with different levels of product 
differentiation, entry barriers, and transparency, (iv) at different stages of 
the product life cycle, and (v) with different demands for technological 
innovation. 
II. REEXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING COMPETITION AND 
COMPETITION LAW 
As Part I discusses, competition has multiple meanings.  This Part 
explores one reason why we have not arrived at one satisfactory definition 
of competition:  Any theory of competition depends on its premises, the 
validity of which depends on the context.  Among the assumptions in any 
theory of competition are (i) the rationality of the market participants, (ii) 
the amount of information they have, (iii) the transaction costs and the 
speed of transactions, (iv) the degree to which market participants act 
independently of one another and care about the interests of third parties, 
and (v) the role of formal rules and informal social, ethical, or moral norms 
                                                 
63
 J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Promoting Innovation: Just How 
“Dynamic” Should Antitrust Law Be? (March 23, 2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100323uscremarks.pdf (observed how antitrust “has 
historically focused more on static than dynamic analysis”); Michael E. Porter, 
Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach, in UNIQUE VALUE: 
COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION: CREATING UNIQUE VALUE FOR ANTITRUST, THE 
ECONOMY, EDUCATION AND BEYOND 154, 157 (Charles D. Weller ed., 2004) (“[w]hile 
protecting short-run consumer welfare measured by price-cost margins is . . . important, . . . 
productivity growth through innovation, where innovation is defined broadly to include not 
only products, but also processes and methods of management . . . [are] the single most 
important determinant of long-term consumer welfare and a nation's standard of living.”).  
64
 LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 86 (2007). 
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in affecting the market participants’ behavior. 
This Article focuses on one important assumption, namely the extent to 
which firms, consumers, and the government are rational and act with 
perfect willpower.65  In relaxing this assumption, one’s conception of 
competition changes.  Firms can be relatively more or less rational than 
consumers in displaying the biases and heuristics identified in the 
behavioral economics literature.  Accordingly, our conception of 
competition can vary under the following four scenarios: 
 
Consumers, 
Rational 
Consumers, 
Bounded Rational 
Firms, Rational I. II. 
Firms,  
Bounded Rational III. IV. 
 
As economist Douglass North observed, the “government is not a 
disinterested party in the economy.”66  Consequently, for each scenario, this 
Part examines the policy implications if the government is either relatively 
more or less rational than consumers and firms. 
Several caveats are necessary.  First, this article simplifies by examining 
consumers and firms.  One can extend the analysis to the rationality of 
intermediaries (e.g., suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers), and firms as 
buyers and consumers as sellers of services.  Second, it is an 
oversimplification to say that millions of consumers and firms are either 
rational or bounded rational.  Under any scenario, some market participants 
will be relatively more rational and have greater willpower than others.  
Bounded rationality and willpower can increase or decrease over time.  
                                                 
65
 For the normative and descriptive shortcomings of the third prong of rational choice 
theory, namely individuals pursue solely their economic self-interest, see Maurice E. 
Stucke, Money, supra note 46, at 907-17. 
66
 NORTH, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 39, at 67. 
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People at any moment can act “more or less rationally depending on a host 
of situational, emotional and other contingent influences.”67  Nor is 
behavior consistent.  People can behave differently depending on their 
gender68 or situational factors, such as whether they are alone or in 
groups.69  Third, firms as institutions can be bounded rational, although in 
different ways and degrees than consumers.  Firms, at times, can minimize 
individual biases, but at other times (such as cults, mobs, and 
“groupthink”70) can displace independent thinking. 
Finally, in mapping each scenario, this Article first examines 
competition using the interaction of firms and consumers, and then 
introduces the rationality of the government in discussing the policy 
implications.  This Article’s baseline is a free-market economy.  With a 
centrally-planned economy, the analysis begins by examining the rationality 
of the government relative to private firms and consumers.  With these 
caveats in mind, the purpose here is to explore generally how our 
conception of competition changes when relaxing one key assumption. 
III.  FOUR SCENARIOS OF COMPETITION AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Scenario I: Both Firms and Consumers Are Rational   
 
The first scenario reflects neoclassical economic theory and competition 
policy today.  A perfectly competitive market assumes transparent prices, 
highly elastic demand curves, easy entry and exit, and perfectly informed 
rational profit-maximizing producers and consumers.71  Price equals 
                                                 
67
 Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 
TRANSACTIONS (forthcoming Spring 2011). 
68
 Jeff Sommer, How Men’s Overconfidence Hurts Them as Investors, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 14, 2010, at 4 (Bus.). 
69
 PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT (2008). 
70
 Robert S. Baron, So Right It's Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of 
Polarized Group Decision Making, in Vol. 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 219 (Mark. P. Zanna, ed. 2005). 
71
 BLACK, supra note 56, at 348. 
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marginal cost.  Market forces will deliver the efficient level of outputs with 
the most efficient techniques, using the minimum quantity of inputs.72 
But perfect competition, critics have long argued, cannot serve as the 
policymaker’s conception of competition.73  First, as the Chicago School 
jurist Richard Posner recognized, “No market fits the economist’s model of 
perfect competition.”74  Second, perfect competition is inconsistent with our 
real world view of competition, which over the past century has 
increasingly focused on productive and dynamic efficiencies.75  Imagine the 
reaction in an Ivy-League MBA program where perfect competition is the 
idealized end-state.  If true, perfect competition would render the students’ 
services and future employers’ products as fungible and their high tuition 
unnecessary.  Instead, for MBA students, competition “is a perpetual flight 
from the zero-profit abyss.”76  Third, the model, which idealizes 
                                                 
72
 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 106–41 (15th ed. 
1995). 
73
 Park, Competition, supra note 20, at 349; Blaug, supra note 54, at 39; McNulty, 
supra note 20, at 641; HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 58, at 96; JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942). 
74
 FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Realty 
Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1368 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Perfect competition is a theoretical 
concept; all markets are subject to varying degrees of imperfections”) (quoting Austin, 
Real Estate Boards, and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1325, 1353-1354 (1970)); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2007), http:// go-
vinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (“real world 
contains very few such markets.”). 
75
 Vickers, supra note 19, at 7; see also Douglass C. North, Economic Performance 
Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 359 (1994) (“Neoclassical theory is simply an 
inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce development.”); 
McNulty, supra note 20, at 649; HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 58, at 96 
(“Advertising, undercutting, and improving (“differentiating”) the goods or services 
produced are all excluded by definition—‘perfect’ competition means indeed the absence 
of all competitive activities.”). 
76
 M.A. Adelman, Economic and Legal Concepts of Competition, 41 J. FARM ECON. 
1197, 1197 (1959); Mary Keeney et al., Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of 
Ireland, Research Technical Paper: How do Firms Set Prices? Survey Evidence from 
Ireland, 7/RT/10, at 3 (May 2010) (finding that autonomous price setting prevails when 
firm considers competition to be absent, the most common approach in setting price is 
based on firms’ costs and self-determined profit margin, and only one-third of firms set 
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homogeneity in products and knowledge, is far from desirable.  Who wants 
to live in a world where after providing homogenous goods and services, we 
drive homogenous cars to homogenous homes?77   
In defense of perfect competition, the Chicago School economist 
George Stigler said that any concept to be useful in scientific analysis is 
abstract:  “If a science is to deal with a large class of phenomena, clearly it 
cannot work with concepts that are faithfully descriptive of even one 
phenomenon, for then they will be grotesquely undescriptive of others.”78  
Under his logic, zoologists could not distinguish among Alaskan Hares 
(Lepus othus), Arctic Hares (Lepus arcticus) and Black-tailed Jackrabbits 
(Lepus californicus).  Zoologists simply would call them collectively as 
creatures that hop.  Moreover, if a zoologist calls these creatures Alaskan 
Hares, she is correct at least sometimes (when a Lepus othus hops past her).  
But if an economist describes all competition as perfect competition, she is 
always wrong.  Perfect competition does not embrace or represent any form 
of actual competition.  It is akin to the Easter Bunny. 
An economic model can assume idealized conditions:  market 
participants are rational with perfect knowledge of the conditions of supply 
and demand.  Under these conditions, market participants “are supposed to 
know absolutely the consequences of their acts when they are performed, 
and to perform them in the light of the consequences.”79  But since perfect 
                                                                                                                            
price primarily by following that of their closest competitor), 
http://www.centralbank.ie/data/TechPaperFiles/prices_rtpMay10.pdf. For an excellent 
recent discussion of this, see Deven R. Desai & Spencer Weber Waller, Brands, 
Competition and the Law (Feb. 1, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545893. 
77
 One example was the Cultural Revolution in China where “[a]ny form of personal 
taste in clothing was out of bounds—women wore uniformly flat heels and most people 
donned Red Guard-style green uniform jackets, baggy trousers and caps, with a badge of 
the Chairman [Mao] on the tunic pocket.”  FENBY, supra note 159, at 457; see also 
RODERICK MACFARQUHAR & MICHAEL SCHOENHALS, MAO’S LAST REVOLUTION 116 
(2006). 
78
 Stigler, supra note 20, at 17. 
79
 Id. at 12 (quoting FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921)). 
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competition is neither descriptive nor normative, it is of little utility in 
dealing with day-to-day competition policy issues.  
The next gradation is to assume rational actors with incomplete 
knowledge.  Some information is unobtainable.  Other information, while 
obtainable, is too costly to procure.80  In this market economy, the Austrian 
School economist Ludwig von Mises observed, rational consumers, not 
firms, should be supreme.  In their purchasing behavior, consumers 
ultimately determine “what should be produced and in what quantity and 
quality.”81  Mises, in his belief of consumer sovereignty, was skeptical 
about the evils of private monopolies:  Rational consumers with willpower 
often can take care of themselves in the marketplace.  But this is not always 
true.82  Imperfect information and informational asymmetries, for example, 
can lead to “lemon” markets where dishonest dealers for goods or services 
drive out honest dealers,83 and thereby inhibit innovation. 
The trickier aspect, as the next three scenarios address, is the descent to 
                                                 
80
 William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration 
of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers 60 (“Rational consumers and 
producers will invest in becoming informed only up until the point where the marginal cost 
of information equals its marginal value.”), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11254.htm#N_1_. 
81
 MISES, supra note 64, at 17. 
82
 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 477 (1992); Queen 
City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 446 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Kodak is 
merely a concession to fact that markets do not always work perfectly, and sometimes, but 
not always, these [information] imperfections can create sufficient market power to justify 
possible antitrust liability.”); see also Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It On The Chin: 
Imperfect Information Could Play A Crucial Role In The Post-Kodak World, 62 
ANTITRUST L.J. 193, 195 (1993) (“Another important lesson of Kodak is that imperfect 
information can be a crucial factor in defining relevant markets.”). 
83
 FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922) (“The honest manufacturer's 
business may suffer, not merely through a competitor's deceiving his direct customer, the 
retailer, but also through the competitor's putting into the hands of the retailer an unlawful 
instrument, which enables the retailer to increase his own sales of the dishonest goods, 
thereby lessening the market for the honest product.”); George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 495 
(1970) (cost of dishonesty includes “loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of 
existence”). 
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bounded rational actors with imperfect willpower, who act with incomplete 
knowledge.  Markets, where many participants have bounded rationality 
and willpower, can lead to additional undesirable outcomes. 
1. Scenario I’s Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is Rational  
A trinity of rational firms, consumers and government paradoxically can 
justify either limited government or a centrally-planned economy.84  As 
Stigler observed, a “perfect market may also exist under monopoly.”85  
Logically monopolies can be private or government enterprises.  If the 
latter, a state planner could model scenarios using the hypothetical profit-
maximizer and centrally plan a similar outcome.  Because rational profit-
maximizing behavior is predictable, a temptation exists to nudge 
competition closer to perfect competition under “the guiding hand of some 
elite corps of governmental and non-governmental policy-makers.”86 
On the other hand, the stronger the presumption of rationality, the 
laissez-faire argument goes, the more likely the market is perceived in 
becoming efficient, the less need for governmental regulation.87  Generally, 
with rational market participants acting with the optimal amount of 
information in markets with no negative externalities, there is little for the 
government to do.88  Transactions are presumably mutually beneficial as 
market participants contract to further their interests.  The government 
perhaps can facilitate competition by reducing the market participants’ 
                                                 
84
 See also JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC 
CALAMITIES 59 (2009) (discussing Oskar Lange’s same observations on a centrally-
planned economy and perfect competition). 
85
 Stigler, supra note 20, at 14. 
86
 HM Blake & WK Jones, In Defense of Antitrust 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 378 
(1965). 
87
 Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 485 n.23 
(3d Cir. 1992) (“Most of the work of ‘Chicago School’ theorists has centered on the 
general proposition that significant economic harm cannot occur (and hence the antitrust 
laws should not interfere) in competitive markets.”); Michael A. Salinger, Behavioral 
Economics, Consumer Protection, and Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2010, 
at 68. 
88
 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, 69. 
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transaction costs (such as providing a model contract and well-functioning 
judiciary system) or by lowering the participants’ search and information 
costs (such as combating fraud).89  But the stronger the rationality 
presumption, the more likely the government, subject to rent-seeking, is 
perceived to impede the path toward allocative efficiency.90 
Even in Scenario I, it does not follow that the government always does 
little.  First, the government must address the commonly identified types of 
market failure under neo-classical economic theory, such as (i) the sustained 
exercise of market power;91 (ii) externalities;92 (iii) public goods;93 and (iv) 
significant informational asymmetries or uncertainty.94  So the rational 
government can increase price transparency (by restricting competitors’ 
concerted efforts to reduce it or mandating public disclosures), internalize 
negative externalities (such as imposing on polluters a carbon tax), 
prosecute anticompetitive restraints of trade (such as price-fixing cartels or 
monopolist’s efforts to unfairly increase rivals’ costs or deter entry), and 
enjoin mergers to monopoly. 
Second, competitive markets do not always yield the best or desired 
outcome.  “It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics 
                                                 
89
 Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a 
Dominant Firm’s Deception?, 63 SMU L. REV. 1069 (2010). 
90
 See, e.g., Avinash Dixit, In Honor of Paul Krugman: Winner of the John Bates 
Clark Medal, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 182 n.7 (1993) (“there is no market failure so bad that 
the U.S. government and political process could not do even worse”). 
91
 CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 126. 
92
 BLACK, supra note 56, at 168 (where the “cost or benefit arising from any activity 
which does not accrue to the person or organization carrying on the activity”); A. C. PIGOU, 
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1962). 
93
 Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958) 
(whereby the payers for the goods cannot exclude the non-payers from consuming (or 
benefitting) from the goods (e.g., national defense)). 
94http://www.economist.com/research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=M#marketfail
ure; see also François Moreau, The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics, 28 
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 847, 849 (2004). 
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that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest.”95  
Unbridled capitalism, Professors Akerlof and Shiller write, “does not 
automatically produce what people really need; it produces what they think 
they need, and are willing to pay for.”96  Competition can maximize output 
of products that eventually wipe out the economy.97 
Third, the government must address behavior that is individually 
rational but collectively irrational.98  In examining the financial crisis, for 
example, Posner described how rational self-interested behavior of “law-
abiding financiers and consumers can precipitate an economic disaster.”99  
Self-interest, for Posner, is a private virtue in that competition drives 
businesses to profit maximization, which drives economic progress.100  But 
competitive self-interested behavior, at times, is a public vice.  An 
overleveraged financial institution can ignore the small probability that its 
risky conduct in conjunction with its competitors’ risky conduct may bring 
down the entire economy.  Each firm in pursuing its self-interest will incur 
greater leverage to maximize profits.101  So even for rational-choice 
theorists like Posner, the government must serve as a countervailing force to 
such self-interested rational private behavior by better regulating financial 
institutions.102 
                                                 
95
 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 36 (“It is not a correct 
deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates 
in the public interest.”); STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 273. 
96
 AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 5, at 26. 
97
 Id.; see also Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, 
at A01 (noting several Clinton and Bush administrations officials’ opposition to regulation 
of derivatives). 
98
 CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 139-50, 309. 
99
 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 107 (2009); see also id. at 111-112; CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 
209-17. 
100
 POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 99, at 107. 
101
 See, e.g., CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 221-27. 
102
 POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 99, at 107. 
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2. Scenario I’s Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is Bounded 
Rational 
Rational firms and consumers often will be worse off when a meddling 
bounded rational government seeks to regulate their competitive behavior.  
Market forces invariably would provide a more efficient or timely 
solution.103 
But one first must inquire why the government is less rational than the 
market participants.  One theory is dispositional:  The government attracts 
bounded rational employees, namely, as Mises called them, those unfit to 
serve their fellow citizens, but who want to rule them.104  But this assumes 
that civil servants’ disposition differs from consumers’ and firms’.  
Government workers, however, are also consumers (and former employees 
in private firms).  Consequently, it is unlikely that civil servants are more 
rational in their private transactions (or prior jobs) than in their government 
offices.   
A second theory is that the bounded rationality is situational. Market 
forces provide greater incentives for private firms and consumers to 
improve their willpower and rationality.105  In their work decisions, civil 
servants, in contrast, have weaker incentives to avoid mistakes because of 
political myopia, the lack of direct accountability to voters, and regulatory 
capture.  Under this theory, attracting business executives to oversee 
government agencies, and promoting a revolving door between the 
government and private sector will not eliminate bounded rationality, as the 
situational forces remain.  The bureaucracy is not structured to experiment 
                                                 
103
 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 
124 (2005) (“markets generally work well when left alone, [and] intervention is justified 
only in the relatively few cases where the judiciary can fix the problem more reliably, more 
cheaply, or more quickly than the market can fix itself”).  
104
 MISES, supra note 64, at 75. 
105
 Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism & Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 140–41, 
144–46 (2006) (modeling how consumers face stronger incentives to correct errors that 
directly impact their well-being than do government bureaucrats). 
24 RECONSIDERING COMPETITION [16-Sep-11 
for the purpose of maximizing profits, but for the employees, consistent 
with the rule of law, to “obey rules and regulations established by a superior 
body.”106 
Logically under this scenario, a bounded rational government should not 
be problematic for competition policy.  There exists the risk that the 
government, captured by powerful special interests, impedes competition. 
But rational citizens, recognizing this risk, would rely on structural, rather 
than behavioral, safeguards to prevent the concentration of power in either 
the government or marketplace.107  Accordingly the demand for 
governmental antitrust services would diminish to the instances of sustained 
market failure, which market forces cannot correct. The bounded rational 
government would undertake measures (preferably structural) to prevent (or 
remedy) these market failures, under the careful guidance of rational voters.  
Otherwise, rational market participants in a well-functioning democracy 
would increasingly rely on market forces for the solution. 
B.  Scenario II: Rational Firms and Bounded Rational Consumers  
Here rational firms can compete to exploit or help consumers with 
bounded rationality and willpower.  Consumers with bounded willpower 
sacrifice their long-term interests (such as increased savings) for immediate 
consumption (and increased debt),108 and display time-inconsistent 
preferences.109  When the activity involves immediate costs and delayed 
                                                 
106
 MISES, supra note 64, at 55. 
107
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger 
Remedies (Oct. 2004) (structural remedies in merger cases are preferred as “they are 
relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government entanglement in the 
market”), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf; Louis D. Brandeis, 
Scientific Management and Trusts, in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE 
BRANDEIS 386 (1930) (observing how accepting mergers to monopolies with behavioral 
safeguards is like “surrendering liberty and substituting despotism with safeguards”). 
108
 Ned Welch, A Marketer’s Guide to Behavioral Economics, MCKINSEY Q. (Feb. 
2010). 
109
 Samuel M. McClure et al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate & Delayed 
Monetary Rewards, SCIENCE, Oct. 13, 2004, at 503, 504 (noting how if someone offered 
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benefits (e.g., exercising, studying), consumers procrastinate.110  When the 
activity involves immediate benefits and delayed costs, consumers find it 
harder to delay gratification.111 
Behavioral economics, commented one of its pioneers, uses scientific 
methods to explore human behavior already known to “advertisers and 
used-car salesmen.”112  Rational firms manipulate consumption decisions by 
• using framing effects and changing the reference point, such that 
the price change is viewed as a discount, rather than a 
surcharge;113  
• anchoring consumers to an artificially high suggested retail 
price, from which bounded rational consumers negotiate;114  
                                                                                                                            
$10 today versus $11 tomorrow, person would be tempted to choose the former; whereas if 
present choice involved a distant payoff ($10 in a year from now versus $11 in a year and a 
day from now), same person would likely choose the latter). 
110
 Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 
103 (1999) (discussing welfare implications of sophisticated person, who knows exactly 
what her future self's preferences will be, and naïve person, who believes her future self’s 
preferences will be identical to her current self's, not realizing that as she gets closer to 
executing decisions her tastes will change). 
111
 Id. at 110 (using example of seeing a mediocre film this weekend rather than 
waiting to see a better film released several weeks later). 
112
 GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY SMART PEOPLE MAKE BIG MONEY 
MISTAKES AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 23 (1999) (quoting Amos Tversky). 
113
 The way the choice is framed—such as a sure gain or avoiding a loss—can 
significantly impact the outcome of the consumers’ choice.  Daniel Kahneman, Maps of 
Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 
1458 (2003). Consumers may be less concerned with the elimination of a discount than a 
price increase (although both have the same net effect).  Thus deviations from the 
perceived reference point may be marked by asymmetric price elasticity: consumers may 
be more sensitive to (and angry about) price increases than when the manufacturer 
eliminates a discount or does not reduce prices during periods of deflation. 
114
 In one experiment, MBA students put down the last 2 digits of their social security 
number (e.g., 14).  The students then participants monetized it (e.g., $14), and then 
answered for each bidded item Yes or No if they would pay that amount for the item. The 
students then stated the maximum amount they were willing to pay for each auctioned 
product.  Students with the highest ending SSN (80-99) bid the highest and those with  the 
lowest SSN (1-20) bid the lowest, and those with highest-ending SSN bid 216 to 346 
percent higher than students with low-end SSNs.  DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: 
THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 25-28 (2008).  
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• adding decoy options (such as a restaurant’s adding a higher 
priced wine) to make the other options appear relatively less 
expensive;115   
• using the sunk cost fallacy to remind bounded rational 
consumers of the financial commitment they already made to 
induce them to continue paying installments on an item, whose 
value is less than the remainder of payments; 
• using the availability heuristic116 to drive purchases, such as an 
airline travel insurer using an emotionally salient death (from 
‘‘terrorist acts’’) rather than a death from ‘‘all possible 
causes;’’117 
• taking advantage of the focusing illusion in advertisements (i.e., 
consumers predicting greater personal happiness from 
consumption of the advertised good and not accounting one’s 
adaptation to the new product);118  
• giving the impression that their goods and services are of better 
quality because they are higher priced;119 and 
                                                 
115
 Similarly, people rarely choose things in absolute terms, but instead based on their 
relative advantage to other things.  Id. at 2.  As Ariely discusses, by adding a third more 
expensive choice, for example, the marketer can steer consumers to a more expensive 
second choice.  Id.  MIT students, in one experiment, were offered three choices for the 
Economist magazine: (i) Internet-only subscription for $59 (sixteen students); (ii) print-
only subscriptions for $125 (no students); and (iii) print-and-Internet subscriptions for $125 
(eighty-four students).  Id. at 5. When the “decoy” second choice (print-only subscriptions) 
was removed and only the first and third options were presented, the students did not react 
similarly. Id. at 5–6. Instead sixty-eight students opted for Internet-only subscription for 
fifty-nine dollars (up from sixteen students) and only thirty-two students chose print-and-
Internet subscriptions for $125 (down from eighty-four students).  Id. at 5–6. 
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 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, SCIENCE, Sept. 27, 1974, at 1127 (noting situations where people assess the 
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occurrences can be brought to mind”). 
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 E.J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35–51 (1993). 
118See supra note . 
119
 Ariely for example conducted several experiments that revealed the power of higher 
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• seeking to avoid price competition through branding.120 
Rational credit card companies, as one example, can capitalize on this 
bounded rationality and willpower in two ways:  First, they can compete in 
ways to encourage consumers to charge more (and maximize fees for the 
banks).121  Competition profits the rational firms but leaves consumers 
increasingly miserable with greater debt.  Second, rational credit card 
companies can compete in helping consumers achieve their long-term 
interests by providing them with commitment devices.  Sophisticated 
                                                                                                                            
prices.  ARIELY, supra note 114, at 181-86. In one experiment, nearly all the participants 
reported less pain after taking a placebo priced at $2.50 per dose; when the placebo was 
discounted to 10 cents per dose, only half of the participants experienced less pain.  Id. at 
182-83.  Similarly, MIT students who paid regular price for the “SoBe Adrenaline Rush” 
beverage reported less fatigue than the students who paid one-third of regular price for the 
same drink.  Id. at 184-85.  SoBe Adrenaline Rush beverage was next promoted as energy 
for the students’ mind, and students after drinking the placebo, had to solve as many word 
puzzles within 30 minutes. Students who paid regular price for the drink got on average 9 
correct responses, versus students who paid a discounted price for the same drink got on 
average 6.5 questions right.  Id. at 185-86.  Similarly, according to researchers at the 
Stanford Graduate School of Business and the California Institute of Technology, “if a 
person is told he or she is tasting two different wines—and that one costs $5 and the other 
$45 when they are, in fact, the same wine—the part of the brain that experiences pleasure 
will become more active when the drinker thinks he or she is enjoying the more expensive 
vintage.” http://news-service.stanford.edu/pr/2008/pr-wine-011608.html; see also Jonathan 
D. Glater & Alan Finder, In Tuition Game, Popularity Rises With Price, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
12, 2006 (discussing how Ursinus College, believing it was losing applicants because of its 
low tuition, raised its tuition and fees 17.6 percent in 2000 (but offered more financial aid), 
and received nearly 200 more applications the following year), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/education/12tuition.html?pagewanted=print. 
120
 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A 
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1054-58 (1991).  A famous antitrust 
example is Clorox, whose bleach is chemically indistinguishable from rival brands. FTC v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).  Nonetheless, Clorox invested millions of 
dollars in promoting its brand of bleach, and often charged a higher price for its bleach.  
One would think that a market, where one company sells a fungible chemically 
indistinguishable product at a price premium, would be attractive for potential entrants.  
But Procter & Gamble sought to purchase Clorox rather than enter the liquid bleach market 
independently.  And Clorox bleach, according to the company website, remains today the 
U.S. industry leader with 64 percent of sales.  
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/CLX/895785564x0x319009/61002338-3AE9-
40B6-8B3A-592193C6364E/FactSheet_2009_Final.pdf. 
121
 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 56 
(2008) (“data on credit choice and use show that consumer mistakes cost hundreds of 
dollars a year per consumer”). 
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consumers, recognizing their bounded willpower, can demand commitment 
devices.122  Every day, for example, people have part of their salaries 
automatically deducted into separate investment accounts, hire personal 
trainers to ensure they exercise, and set their clocks slightly fast.  Banks 
accordingly can offer credit cards with commitment devices to enable 
consumers to save more.  Consumers in their dispassionate state can elect to 
cap subsequent credit card purchases for certain categories of goods or 
services (e.g., limiting spending on Starbucks coffee to $5 per week).123 
Why wouldn’t rational firms always exploit consumers?  One factor is 
rational firms’ ability to identify consumers with weaker rationality and 
willpower for certain decisions.  Consumers can make better decisions 
when they have greater experience, have good feedback on earlier errors, or 
rely on salient information.124  Thus identifying instances where bounded 
rationality can be exploited is a business unto itself.125  Rational firms can 
target bounded rational consumers by offering to help them with their 
earlier problems, such as selling their time shares, preventing home 
foreclosures, or improving their credit rating. 
At times exploiting irrationality benefits society.  Rational firms can 
dampen investors’ speculation (e.g., buying a company’s stock on the hope 
that past price increases will continue with future price increases).  The 
interaction of people each of whom possesses partial knowledge can yield 
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 O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 110, at 103-24; David Laibson, Golden Eggs and 
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 444-45 (1997). 
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 Ron Lieber, Your Money: Your Card Has Been Declined, Just as You Wanted, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/your-money/credit-and-debit-
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 John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q. J. 
ECON. 41, 41 (2003). 
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 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 121, at 23-24. Credit rating agency Equifax, for 
example, advertises “ ‘advanced profiling techniques’ to identify people who show a 
‘statistical propensity to acquire new credit’ within [ninety] days.”  Brad Stone, Banks 
Mine Data and Woo Troubled Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/22target.html?_r=1. 
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valuable information, such as a remarkably accurate prediction of an event 
in prediction markets.126  Rational investors can exploit irrationality, as 
these predictions markets have a defined event (e.g., the winner of the U.S. 
presidential elections) and end date when bets are settled.127   
But rational firms, even after identifying bounded rational consumers, 
cannot always exploit them.  Consumers, recognizing their bounded 
rationality, can turn to rational advisors or consumer advocates (such as 
Consumers Reports).  Many markets, unlike prediction markets, lack a 
defined end-point.  A rational investor could “short” a company’s stock to 
profit when the stock price declines.128  But the rational trader cannot 
determine when the speculation bubble will burst.  Rational traders, due to 
investor pressure, can be subject to short-term horizons, and follow the herd 
for short-term gains.129  Rational traders may also find it more profitable to 
devise products to facilitate, rather than combat, speculation.130 
Scenario II competition presents other forms of market failure.  One is 
systemic behavioral exploitation.131  In competitive markets, one expects 
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 Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social 
Behavior?, SCIENCE, Jan. 6, 2006, at 47, 52; see also HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM, supra note 
58, at 91. 
127
 Id. 
128
 The Fool FAQ, Shorting Stocks (“An investor who sells stock short borrows shares 
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 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, in II ADVANCES IN 
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 CASSIDY, supra note 84, at 182-84; ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 172 (2002) (citing several examples, including 
future contracts on tulips during the Tulipmania in the 1630s). 
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 Max Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law and 
Consumer Protection, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 7, 17-18 (2010) (discussing how behavioral 
exploitation may produce longer-lasting consumer harm).  Prof. Huffman’s article 
prompted an interesting roundtable discussion among competition law lawyers, 
economists, and policy officials.  Antitrust Marathon IV: With Authority -- A discussion led 
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rational firms to inform bounded rational consumers of other firms’ 
attempts to exploit them.  Providing this information is another facet of 
competition:  Trust us, we won’t exploit you.132  But too frequently rather 
than compete to build consumers’ trust in their business, competitors 
engage in similar exploitation.133 
Rational firms can compete in finding cleverer ways to attract and 
exploit bounded rational consumers companies.  As the U.K.’s Office of 
Fair Trading recently experimented, firms can jointly manipulate consumer 
consumption behavior and leave them worse off under five common price 
frames: (i) “drip pricing”, where a lower price is initially disclosed to the 
consumer and additional charges are added as the sale progresses; (ii) 
“sales,” where the “sales” price is referenced off an inflated regular price 
                                                                                                                            
by Philip Marsden and Spencer Weber Waller, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 1-127 (2010). 
132
 SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1994) (“If the 
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George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 808 (1992)). 
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 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 474 n.21 
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F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941) (Ford following industry leader General Motors in advertising a 
deceptive six-percent financing plan); Matthew Bennett et al., What Does Behavioral 
Economics Mean for Competition Policy?, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 111, 118 (Spring 
2010); Eliana Garcés, The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer and Competition 
Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 145, 150 (2010); Huffman, supra note 131.  
Antitrust scholar Robert Steiner, who was also the former president of the Kenner Products 
toy company, described his concerns about the industry self-regulation of toy commercials 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  Originally favoring industry self-policing, he feared the greater 
anticompetitive consequences of deceptive advertising.  Absent regulation, some toy 
manufacturers would air deceptive ads, which would pull down the toy industry.  Unless 
his company matched “the exaggerations and sometimes the outright deceptions of certain 
competitors, our commercials might not be exciting enough to move our toys off the shelf.”  
He foresaw bad commercials driving out the good ones, rendering TV advertising 
relatively ineffective. Robert L. Steiner, Double Standards in the Regulation of Toy 
Advertising, 56 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1988). 
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(was $2, now $1); (iii) “complex pricing” (e.g., three-for-two offers), where 
the unit price requires some computation; (iv) “baiting,” where sellers 
promote special deals with only a limited number of goods available at the 
discounted price; and (v) “time limited offers,” where the special price is 
available for a short period.134  The OFT experiment found drip pricing and 
time-limited offers particularly detrimental.  Not surprisingly one sees such 
exploitive “drip pricing” for airline tickets,135 car rentals,136 and prepaid 
telephone calling cards.137 
To exploit consumers, rational firms can compete in ways to reduce 
price transparency and increase the complexity of their products (or product 
terms).138  Take credit cards as one example.  A single credit card account 
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245 (1993) (same); In re Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 111 F.T.C. 644 (1989) (settling charges 
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(requiring national car rental company to disclose charges that are mandatory or are not 
reasonably avoidable to every consumer that inquires about prices). 
137
 Bennett et al., supra note 133, at 117.  
138
 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 81, 108; Edward J. Janger & Susan Block-Lieb, 
Consumer Credit and Competition: The Puzzle of Competitive Credit Markets, 6 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 68, 71 (2010) (“Price competition often takes the form of price 
concealment.”); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 121, at 27-28; Xavier Gabaix & David 
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Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 505-08 (2006). Visa, MasterCard, and American 
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can have multiple APRs for different types of credit extensions, or that 
apply for limited time periods.  General purpose credit card issuers can 
compete by reducing “front-end” costs, such as eliminating annual fees and 
substantially discounting initial interest rates.  Consumers, ill-informed 
about the long-term costs of different credit cards, can make decisions on 
incidental benefits (such as receiving a T-shirt with the university logo 
when signing up for a credit card on a college campus).  The credit card 
companies then overcharge the consumer on the less salient “back-end” 
costs, with higher late fees and penalties and over-the-credit-limit fees.139  
At times, consumers are disclosed the information, but do not understand 
the key terms that affect the cost of using their credit card; at other times, 
consumers simply do not act on the information.140  
Rational companies can also seek to exploit consumers’ optimism bias. 
One former CEO, for example, explained how his credit card company 
successfully targeted vulnerable low-income customers “by offering ‘free’ 
credit cards that carried heavy hidden fees.”141  The company “used to use 
the word ‘penalty pricing’ or ‘stealth pricing.’”142  The former CEO 
explained how these ads targeted consumers’ optimism: “When people 
make the buying decision, they don’t look at the penalty fees because they 
never believe they'll be late. They never believe they'll be over limit, 
right?”143 Bounded rational consumers, who are overoptimistic on their 
ability and willpower to make pay off the card annually, underestimate the 
                                                                                                                            
and MasterCard settled with the DOJ. 
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 Statement by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (May 2, 2008), 
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costs of their future borrowings144 and demand and over-consume products 
contrary to their long-term interests.  Optimistic consumers opt for credit 
cards with lower annual fees (but higher financing fees and penalties) over 
better suited products (e.g., credit cards with higher annual fees but lower 
interest rates and late payment penalties).145  
For a rational competitor to debias the consumers may be too costly or 
not worthwhile, given the free-rider problem.  Suppose a credit card issuer 
incurs the cost to educate consumers of their bounded willpower and 
overconfidence.  Other competitors can free-ride on the company’s 
educational efforts and quickly offer similar credit cards with lower annual 
fees.  Ultimately, such competition would reduce the credit card industry’s 
profits, without offering any lasting competitive advantage to the first-
mover.146  Consequently, the industry is better off exploiting consumers’ 
bounded rationality.  Consumers, overconfident in their financial prowess, 
will not demand better-suited products.  Firms have little financial incentive 
to help consumers make better choices.147  Market demand, accordingly, 
will skew toward products and services that exploit or reinforce the 
consumers’ bounded will-power and rationality. 
1. Scenario II’s Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is Rational 
Customers under this scenario may reign supreme (in choosing 
commitment devices to address their bounded rationality and willpower) or 
be exploited.  So in distinguishing between behavioral exploitation and 
when firms are helping bounded rational consumers, the government under 
Scenario II faces two difficulties. 
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One difficulty is that the government cannot necessarily rely on 
consumers’ choices to infer their utility.  Economists historically assessed 
people’s preferences, not by their subjective beliefs or intentions, but by 
their actual choices.148  But if heuristics and biases systematically appear in 
consumer decision-making, then consumer choices do not always reflect 
actual consumer preferences.149  Bounded rational consumers in Scenario II 
can predict poorly as to what makes them happy.150  At times, rational firms 
through advertising and promotions manipulate consumer preferences.151 
A second difficulty is that some sophisticated consumers, aware of their 
bounded rationality and willpower, will incur costs on commitment devices 
that could appear to a rational government as exploitative.  Take for 
example Christmas club savings accounts.  Bank customers deposit 
throughout the year into their Christmas accounts (which do not offer 
superior interest rates) and cannot withdraw the funds until the holidays.  A 
rational government official could view Christmas accounts as exploitative:  
Customers get less (in terms of interest rate and liquidity).  Banks get more 
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(longer time horizon to use funds without risk of withdrawals).  Rational 
consumers with willpower would chose risk-free illiquid funds with better 
yields (e.g., Certificates of Deposit) or keep the funds in their savings 
accounts.  But Christmas accounts provide bounded rational consumers 
with a commitment device and divisibility (namely a separate account 
earmarked for Christmas shopping).152 
Thus a key issue under Scenario II is how the rational government 
identifies and responds to sustained behavioral exploitation.  
Authoritarianism and corporate autocracy are two worst-case scenarios.  
Under a market economy, consumers, through their informed economic 
decisions, should ultimately reign supreme.  But if bounded rational 
consumers choose poorly, one danger is that the rational government by 
default decides for consumers.  If consumers are bounded rational, the 
justification goes, markets are not functioning as efficiently as they could 
be; thus the state becomes the de facto guardian to protect its citizens from 
their irrationality.  But a heightened concern about consumers’ bounded 
rationality raises far greater social and political concerns over consumer 
sovereignty and “the intrusion of bureaucracy into all spheres of human life 
and activity.”153  The concern over behavioral exploitation can increasingly 
justify “the subordination of every individual’s whole life, work, and leisure 
to the orders of those in power and office.”154 
In displacing individual autonomy, the rational government does not 
help consumers improve their willpower or rationality.  Instead the 
government promotes learned helplessness.  Now the government devotes 
greater energies to regulate marketplace behavior and displace the market’s 
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153
 MISES, supra note 64, at 14. 
154
 Id. 
36 RECONSIDERING COMPETITION [16-Sep-11 
function in finding solutions for consumers’ problems.155  The government 
places greater restrictions on consumers to manage their affairs, as it 
devises ways to improve consumers’ diets, to restrict their consumption of 
harmful products, such as alcohol, and for consumers to use their leisure 
time more productively, such as exercising and reading rather than watching 
television.156 
Nor is there any incentive to improve the citizens’ bounded rationality 
and willpower.  A bureaucracy that exists to protect bounded rational 
consumers cannot afford to let its citizens become more rational.  The 
bureaucrats’ livelihood, authority, and status depend on consumers 
remaining sufficiently irrational to justify the bureaucracy’s existence.157  
Instead consumers are encouraged to register their complaints with the 
government, who intercedes on their behalf.  These concerns provide the 
government greater justification to regulate the remaining rational firms’ 
behavior.  To provide what it perceives as the consumers’ needs, the 
government justifies regulating further the production of goods and 
services, leading to less diversity, fewer consumer choices, and greater 
allocative inefficiency.  The heavily regulated firms become de facto state 
enterprises.  As Hayek observed, “planning leads to dictatorship, because 
dictatorship is the most effective instrument of coercion and the 
enforcement of ideals and, as such, essential if central planning on a large 
scale is to be possible.”158 
In this worst-case scenario, economic competition ceases to be a 
concern.  Competition and personal liberty are displaced by a centrally-
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planned economy headed by an authoritarian government.  Thus some 
accept the cost of behavioral exploitation versus the greater costs of losing 
economic freedom to an increasingly authoritarian government.159   
But if the government takes a laissez-faire approach and renounces any 
intention to regulate the market, this raises another danger, namely 
corporate autocracy. Here the outcome is equally anti-democratic.  
Economically powerful firms lobby the government to refrain from 
regulating the marketplace.  Firms, while economically exploiting bounded 
rational consumers, also exploit their fears about authoritarianism.  Firms 
advocate the virtues of consumer sovereignty under a laissez-fair approach.  
Indeed rational choice theory can play into bounded rational consumers’ 
overconfidence as to their sovereignty and ability to discipline firms that 
attempt to exercise market power.  Under this ideology, markets are 
presumably efficient (or heading toward greater efficiency), and 
competition law is limited to the market failures outlined in Scenario I.   
Once economic power and wealth are concentrated, the government and 
its competition policies are used to preserve the status quo.160  Industries in 
pre-war Germany, for example, enlisted the state through compulsory cartel 
laws to complete their market power.161  The dominant firms maintain their 
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power by redefining the goals of competition policy and directing antitrust 
enforcement against unions (which happened early in the Sherman Act’s 
history162).  Antitrust policy characterizes concentration, even to the brink 
of monopoly, as beneficial.  Monopoly profits are praised as “an important 
element of the free-market system,” in serving as an inducement to 
“attract[] ‘business acumen’ in the first place” and engage in “risk taking 
that produces innovation and economic growth.”163  Political and social 
concerns over dominant firms’ influence and the effect of their size on the 
economy as a whole are dismissed as ill-founded fears over bigness and 
prosperity.  These non-economic antitrust goals are deemed out of touch 
with the latest economic thinking, premised on rational choice theory.164  
Once economic and political power is consolidated, monopolies and cartels 
can become “governmental instrumentalities to achieve political ends.”165  
Citizens are denied the right to use the democratic process to protect them; 
instead they navigate the market’s dark alleyways, hoping that little 
economic harm comes to them.  
2. Scenario II’s Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is Bounded 
Rational 
The prospect of bounded rational consumers and government raises 
several additional policy risks.  One risk is that rational firms use consumer 
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protection as a pretext to restrict competition.  To “protect” consumers from 
making irrational decisions, competitors agree to compete only along some 
parameters, such as quality or service, rather than price.  In National Society 
of Professional Engineers v. United States, for example, the competing 
engineers refused “to discuss prices with potential customers until after 
negotiations . . . resulted in the initial selection of an engineer.”166  The 
Society claimed that if engineers discussed prices at the onset with 
prospective clients, low bids would result.  This in turn would tempt 
individual engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public 
safety and health.  The engineers’ behavior, when characterized favorably, 
was paternalistic.  Customers, the engineers argued, could not account all 
the variables involved in the projects’ actual performance.167  The Supreme 
Court rejected the engineers’ justification.168  But the bounded rational 
government, assuming that bounded rational consumers choose poorly, 
might accept it.   
A second risk is that rational competitors use the bounded rational 
government to orchestrate their cartel.  In many aspects, a bounded rational 
government is more effective than a private cartel in policing the anti-
competitive restrictions and punishing any offenders.169 
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A third policy risk arises from the overconfidence bias.  Citizens are 
overconfident in the government’s ability to regulate the market for abuses.  
For example, in one survey “[r]oughly half of all African Americans and 
Hispanics, and over 60 percent of Hispanic immigrants [believed] 
erroneously [that] lenders are required by law to give a borrower the best 
rates possible.”170  The bounded rational government is overconfident in its 
citizens’ ability to fend for themselves171 and the ability of markets to self-
correct.   
A fourth policy risk is that the bounded rational government causes 
greater harm in seeking to protect bounded rational consumers.  For 
example, after a recent disaster, bounded rational consumers and the 
government under the availability heuristic would overestimate the 
probability of that event happening in the future.  The government heavily 
regulates the industry, while not addressing other risks, that while not 
coming immediately to mind, actually cause greater harm.172  Even without 
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the government’s help, bounded rational consumers can overreact, based on 
how the issue is framed173 or to rumors, causing social losses, a concern 
China authorities recently raised.174  
3. Policy Alternatives under Scenario II 
Consumers can be worse off when the government (whether rational or 
bounded rational) acts or does not act.  So what should the government do, 
especially if the extent of its bounded rationality is unknown?  
The government can consider behavioral options, some less paternalistic 
than others, to deter behavioral exploitation while leaving room for 
innovation that benefits consumers and preserves economic liberty.   
One well-known behavioral remedy is for the government to alter 
existing, or create new, default rules.175  One recent issue was that banks 
were exploiting consumers’ propensity to overspend their assigned credit 
limits.  Suppose the consumer with bounded willpower sees designer-label 
shoes on the discount rack.  The consumer has $20 of available credit; the 
shoes cost $100.  The bank permits the consumer to charge the shoes, but 
extracts a high fee.176  Overdraft fees are also an issue with debit cards, 
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where the consumer makes a purchase for an amount greater than the 
balance in the consumer’s bank account.  Consumers paid in 2009 a record 
$38.5 billion in overdraft fees, nearly double the amount reported in 
2000.177  Ninety-three percent of the overdraft revenues came from about 
fourteen percent of the U.S. bank accounts, with the larger banks charging 
the highest fees.178  
Rather than prohibit outright over-the-limit fees or regulate the size of 
such fees, Congress in the Credit CARD Act of 2009 chose a behavioral 
remedy.  It changed the default option.179  Before 2010, many banks 
automatically enrolled consumers in their over-the-limit plan.  Under the 
Act, the credit card company cannot impose an over-the-limit fee for any 
extension of credit in excess of the previously-authorized credit limit unless 
the consumer expressly opts into the over-the-limit plan.180   
For rational actors with perfect willpower, the default option should not 
affect the outcome.  But in the Federal Reserve’s testing, the majority of 
surveyed participants preferred setting the default as consumers having to 
opt into the bank’s overdraft program rather than having to opt out (which 
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many banks preferred).181  Default options have played an important role in 
diverse settings,182 including class actions.183  Changing default options may 
be underway in other areas.  FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, for example, is 
dissatisfied with the “traditional opt-out, ‘notice and choice’ model” that 
“inappropriately places the burden on consumers to read and understand 
lengthy, complicated privacy policies that almost no one reads, and no one 
understands.”184 
As a second option, the government can require consumers to choose 
among the options.  The European Commission, for example, challenged 
Microsoft for bundling or tying its web browser, Internet Explorer to its 
dominant client personal computer operating system, Windows.185  Before 
the settlement, consumers who used Windows had Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer as their default web browser.  Although consumers could 
download other browsers, many did not, a function not attributable 
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necessarily to the superiority of Microsoft’s browser but status quo bias.186 
As part of its settlement, Microsoft now provides consumers a Browser 
Choice Screen.  Rather than having one Internet browser as the default, 
computer users must choose the browser they want from the competing web 
browsers listed on the screen.  It is unclear how successful the settlement 
has been to date.  On the one hand, Microsoft’s share of the European 
browser market declined after the settlement--from 44.9 percent in January 
2010 to 39.8 percent in October 2010.187 But even before the settlement, 
Microsoft’s browser market share was declining.188  So the market share 
could have declined absent the remedy.  On the other hand, the remedy, by 
enabling consumers to easily choose which browser they desire, increases 
the likelihood that the market share reflects more the consumers’ informed 
choice, rather than the monopolist’s.189  
Third, the government can educate the consumer, but use framing, 
prospect theory190 and the availability heuristic to make the information 
more salient.191  To increase the salience of credit card finance charges, for 
example, the Credit CARD Act of 2009 requires a “Minimum Payment 
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Warning.”192  The credit card consumer is told in the monthly statement 
how paying only the minimum amount due will increase the amount of 
interest she pays and the time to repay the balance.  At times, better 
disclosures entail providing less, but more important, information.193 
A fourth option to deter behavioral exploitation is to set one option as 
the default, but impose procedural constraints on opting out.194  For 
example, the Credit CARD Act of 2009 sets as the default that no credit 
card may be issued to, or open end consumer credit plan established by or 
on behalf of, consumers under the age of 21.195  To open a credit card 
account, those under twenty-one must (i) have the signature of a cosigner, 
including the parent, legal guardian, spouse, or any other individual over 
twenty years old who has the means to repay (and be jointly liable for) the 
credit card debts or (ii) submit financial information showing their 
independent means of repaying any obligation arising from the proposed 
extension of credit.196 
A fifth option is to afford purchasers a cooling-off period.  Consumers 
in an emotional, impulsive state can make unwise decisions that they later 
regret.197  Federal and state laws and regulations recognize this.198  For 
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example, consumers solicited at their home or workplace can have three 
days to cancel purchases of $25 or more.199  From a behavioral economics 
perspective, the effectiveness of cooling off periods is mixed.  On the one 
hand, consumers upon reflection can reconsider a purchase, especially one 
involving high pressure sale tactics.  On the other hand, the more time one 
has to complete a task, the behavioral economics literature suggests, the 
greater the likelihood one won’t complete that task.200  For example, a 
customer’s likelihood of redeeming a rebate may be inversely proportional 
to the rebate period’s length.201  Consumers assume that they eventually 
will seek the “discount” but procrastinate. 
A sixth option is to impose a behavioral exploitation tax on the rational 
firm.202  When the estimated social value of the rational firms’ behavior is 
below its private value, the government can tax the rational firm the 
difference.  The aim of the tax is to prevent the firms from unjust enriching 
themselves from their behavioral exploitation.  For example, revenues from 
payday lending that come from APRs above a certain level would be taxed 
at higher rates.  Credit card revenues earned from late fees would be taxed 
at higher rates than revenue from annual fees. 
A seventh option is for the government to take preventive measures to 
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help consumers debias themselves and improve their willpower.  Here the 
aim is to make consumers less susceptible to behavioral exploitation.203  
The government can increase (i) the supply of debiasing methods (e.g., 
adding courses on financial literacy in high school (emphasizing the 
behavioral risks and investors’ susceptibility to overconfidence bias204)), (ii) 
the demand for debiasing (such as imposing procedural constraints on 
consumer participation in high risk areas of behavioral exploitation, such as 
subprime lending, unless the consumer participated in an approved online 
course that outlines the material risks), and (iii) the opportunities to debias, 
such as facilitating timely feedback mechanisms, so that consumers become 
aware of their errors and the costs of their poor choices (e.g., providing 
employees who have not enrolled into a retirement plan a monthly reminder 
of how much money they lost to date in matching funds by not contributing 
to the 401(k)).  The government can also provide consumers with 
commitment devices (to the extent the market has not provided them).  
An eighth option is to increase the search costs of rational firms to 
identify potential victims.  One resounding success of the FTC is enabling 
consumers to easily opt out of all unwanted telephone solicitations.205  The 
government through a similar common listing service can enable consumers 
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to opt out of home or mail solicitations (including credit card offerings), and 
to easily block home-shopping cable stations.  The government can increase 
consumers’ privacy rights to make it harder for firms to identify especially 
bounded rational consumers through their purchasing behavior. 
Some argue that “[a]dvocating soft paternalism is akin to advocating an 
increased role of the incumbent government as an agent of persuasion.”206 
Scenario II’s policy risks indeed represent a balancing act.  While 
government persuasion increases the risk of authoritarianism, government 
inaction carries the risks of behavioral exploitation and corporate autocracy.  
Moreover, anti-“soft” paternalism can itself be paternalistic.  If most 
consumers (like those in the Federal Reserve’s testing) prefer having the 
default as an opt-in (e.g., requiring consumers to opt into the banks’ 
overdraft programs), then assuming that consumers are indeed sovereign, 
the banks should comply.  If the banks, however, are unresponsive to 
consumer demand and require consumers to opt out, why can’t the citizens 
lobby their elected representatives to get what they want?  It is hard to see 
why citizens, in the name of libertarianism, must continue to wait for their 
desired default option. 
Accordingly, under any conception of competition with bounded 
rational consumers, one cannot view antitrust and consumer protection as 
distinct.  Under Scenario II, consumer protection and competition law both 
promote the opportunity of informed consumer choices.  Ideally, informed 
consumers choose among the innovating firms’ solutions for their 
problems.207  Given the importance of individual autonomy in overall well-
being, the government must carefully delineate between behavioral 
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exploitation and behavioral freedom, where firms help consumers address 
their bounded rationality and willpower.  After all, if antitrust policy 
promotes diversity and the process of search and experimentation, it would 
be counterproductive if consumer protection law bans all products except 
the one the government believes is the best.  Ideally, competition and 
consumer protection laws deter market failure (e.g., systemic behavioral 
exploitation), and ensure that consumers, once informed, have a choice as to 
products and services.   
C.  Scenario III: Bounded Rational Firms and Rational Consumers 
Here consumers are relatively more rational than firms in the 
industry.208  Excessive optimism can have procompetitive benefits, such as 
the firms’ willingness to innovate and enter new markets.209  But excessive 
optimism can adversely affect the firms and economy.  Consumers, in 
response to the firms’ behavior, ask, “What were they thinking?”  One 
recurring theme in the business literature is how once mighty firms (e.g., the 
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U.S. car manufacturers210) lose sight of their customers’ needs or are in 
denial.211 
This Scenario helps explain why some corporate executives, with much 
to lose, risk criminal liability by fixing prices with their competitors,212 are 
likely to advocate a merger,213 are overconfident about a merger’s likely 
efficiencies,214 overvalue the purchased assets,215 are overly confident or 
pessimistic about their chances of entering particular markets,216 and 
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consistent with the sunk cost fallacy throw good money after bad in 
corporate projects.217 
Professor Waller recently examined the evidence from corporate finance 
that suggests entire categories of mergers are more likely to destroy, rather 
than enhance, shareholder value.218  Among the well-known biases and 
heuristics relevant to the decision to enter in mergers and acquisitions, 
which frequently result in value destroying transactions, include “myopia, 
loss aversion, endowment effects, status quo bias, extremeness aversion, 
over-optimism, hindsight bias, anchoring heuristics, availability heuristics, 
framing effects, representative bias, saliency effects, and others.”219  
Executives, in behavioral studies, were overconfident in their ability to 
manage a company, systematically underestimated their competitors’ 
strength, and were prone to self-serving interpretations of reality (e.g., 
taking credit for positive outcomes and blaming the environment for 
negative outcomes).220 
Scenario III in theory should be of less concern.  Absent a natural 
monopoly or high entry barriers, rational consumers should take their 
business elsewhere.  The critical assumption is that when bounded rational 
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firms, unlike their rational profit-maximizing counterparts, are 
overoptimistic over a merger’s efficiencies, overconfident in their escaping 
detection for their cartel activities, and more or less risk averse in entering a 
new market, they quickly bear the cost of their miscalculation.  The market 
swiftly punishes the bounded rationality.  The firm swiftly corrects or is 
eliminated. 
But this is not always true.  As the financial crisis reflects, many Wall 
Street firms were not swiftly punished (or their executives ever punished) 
for their bounded rationality.221  Thus one cannot assume that corporate 
behavior is always as, if not more, rational than consumer behavior. 
1. Scenario III’s Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is 
Rational 
One cannot say that the government is always less rational than private 
firms.  With politically-accountable elected representatives from different 
communities, a legislature can see what firms and individuals in any 
community may not see.222  This does not mean that the government is 
always more rational than the average firm or citizen.  But the legislature 
has a unique vantage.  As President Roosevelt wrote in recommending the 
strengthening and enforcement of the antitrust laws, the larger and more 
important question involves honest citizens “who cannot see the social and 
economic consequences of their actions in a modern economically 
interdependent community.”223 
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If private firms are less rational than consumers and the government, 
then one risk under Scenario III is that the government will seek to run the 
marketplace like a government bureaucracy.  The government may seek to 
displace the bounded rational firms with state-owned enterprises or regulate 
the firms with the goal “to organize the whole national economy like the 
postal system.”224  The government in its central planning could become 
less rational.  And the resulting risks (including authoritarianism) and 
societal welfare loss from governmental action may far exceed the losses 
from firms’ bounded irrationality. 
Instead of central planning, a rational government should return to first 
principles, and inquire why consumers did not (or could not) punish the 
bounded rational firm.  When rational consumers are sovereign under 
Scenario III, private firms have a strong incentive to use de-biasing 
mechanisms to gain a competitive advantage and avoid consumer 
punishment.225  Scenario III’s policy implications differ from Scenario II’s.  
Under Scenario II, it makes sense at times to insulate rational firms from 
consumers’ bounded rationality and willpower (such as promoting the 
firm’s incentives to maximize long-term value and economic efficiency, 
contrary to the pressures of bounded rational investors to maximize the 
stock price in the short-term).226  Under Scenario III, in contrast, it makes 
sense at times to expose bounded rational firms to market demands,227 such 
as identifying and eliminating those protective barriers (e.g., high import 
tariffs) or subsidies that reduce the firms’ incentives to debias.228  
                                                                                                                            
KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED 
STATUTES 3408 (1978).  
224
 MISES, supra note 64, at xvi (quoting LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION (1917)). 
225
 Langevoort, supra note 67, at 3, 16. 
226
 Baker et al., supra note 217, at 3. 
227
 Id. at 3.  
228
 Another possibility is that the managerial decisions are infrequent and do not 
provide clear feedback to managers, shareholders and consumers.  Camerer & Malmendier, 
54 RECONSIDERING COMPETITION [16-Sep-11 
One significant incentive to debias is the prospect of failure and market 
exit.229  Suppose a bounded rational firm, overconfident in its risk 
assessment models, becomes more leveraged.  Ideally industry regulators, 
creditors and shareholders monitor the bounded rational firm to prevent 
such over-leveraging.  But if the bounded rational firm is deemed too big 
(or important) to fail, the dynamics change.  A dominant firm has greater 
incentive (and freedom) to take excessive risks.  Rational investors know of 
the firm’s implicit government guarantee.  Its shareholders and creditors 
will not punish this risk-taking: when the risky investments work in the 
firm’s favor, they benefit.  When the risky investments flop, the 
government’s implicit guarantee forecloses the possibility of market exit.230 
The government guarantee itself has value, which the dominant firm can 
use to reduce its borrowing costs.231  The too-big-to-fail firms thus enjoy a 
competitive advantage over smaller rivals, which are allowed to fail.232  
Smaller firms, which cannot undertake such risk, cannot profit accordingly 
when the bets pay off.  Without a government guarantee, the smaller firms’ 
costs of borrowing are higher.  So their incentive is to merge to where they 
too become too big to fail.  Indeed one criticism is that after the crisis, U.S. 
financial institutions increased their market power by acquiring competitors 
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(such as Bank of America absorbing Merrill Lynch and Countrywide, 
JPMorgan Chase acquiring Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, and 
Wells Fargo acquiring Wachovia), while nonbank mortgage lenders exited 
the marketplace.233 
Consequently, since overconfidence, especially for firms less dependent 
on lending intermediaries, can motivate merger activity, rational 
competition officials under Scenario III would display (i) greater skepticism 
over the likely efficiencies of otherwise problematic mergers,234 (ii) greater 
concern over the systemic risks posed by mergers and (iii) greater 
skepticism over the likelihood and magnitude of false positives in merger 
review. 
2. Scenario III’s Policy Implications Assuming the Government Is 
Bounded Rational 
One risk is that the bounded rational government, overconfident in its 
understanding of competition, relies on empirically suspect presumptions.  
In presuming that firms are as rational as consumers, the government’s 
theory of competition resembles Scenario I, when empirically it resembles 
Scenario III.  The bounded rational government’s mergers policies 
accordingly are too lenient while its criminal prosecutions of price-fixers 
are too severe.  
One concern is that the government when confronted with evidence of 
firms’ bounded rationality, either attempts to justify the behavior under 
rational choice theory, or if no explanation exists, ignores it.  For example, 
the U.S. Merger Guidelines assume that market participants behave as 
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rational profit-maximizers.235  Accordingly, sustained market power is not 
theoretically feasible where entry barriers are low.236  Antitrust policy 
assumes that (1) supra-competitive prices will attract rational profit-
maximizing firms into markets characterized with low entry barriers, (2) the 
new entrants will replenish the lost output, and (3) as a result, prices will 
return closer to marginal cost.  Operating under the false impression that 
market participants, pursuing their economic interest, will self-police and 
regulate, the government will be more concerned about the risk of false 
positives than negatives from their enforcement activity, especially in 
markets characterized with moderate to low entry barriers.237  
But under Scenario III, contrary to the Guidelines’ hypothesis, firms do 
not always enter markets with low entry barriers to defeat the exercise of 
market power.238  Nor does a bounded rational government inquire why 
price-fixing occurs in markets with low entry barriers.239  Instead the 
government seeks to reconcile this non-entry with its flawed economic 
theory (e.g., markets that “superficially” appear to have low entry barriers, 
actually are more difficult to enter so rational profit-maximizing firms 
accurately discerned that entry would have been unprofitable at pre-merger 
levels).240  
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While too lenient in merger review, the bounded rational government, 
overconfident in its theory of optimal deterrence, can be too punitive in its 
criminal antitrust prosecutions.  This too can harm consumers. The 
government erroneously believes that price fixers, under Scenario III, 
behave as rational profit-maximizers.  To deter cartels, neoclassical 
economic theory posits that the penalty should equal at least the violation’s 
expected net harm to others (plus enforcement costs) divided by the 
probability of detection and proof of the violation.241  Setting the antitrust 
penalty at this optimal level, in theory, should result in the socially optimal 
level of price-fixing.  
Faced with evidence of durable cartels and high recidivism, a bounded 
rational government, under its optimal deterrence theory, can increase 
either: (i) the probability of detection (which is difficult with an already 
generous amnesty program to induce price fixers to implicate their co-
conspirators); or (ii) the criminal (and/or civil) penalties, which presumably 
are sub-optimal in deterring cartels.  The problem is if the antitrust penalties 
are already at (or above) the optimal level.  Bounded rational firms persist 
in their price-fixing not because the fines are too low but due to situational 
(e.g., peer pressure) and dispositional (e.g., executives’ overconfidence in 
escaping detection) factors.  The bounded rational government fails to 
recognize this possibility.  Rather than address these situational and 
dispositional factors through a pluralism of mechanisms, such as criminal 
and civil penalties, structural means (improved merger review), and 
informal norms that highlight price fixing’s ethical and moral 
implications,242 the government instead continues to increase the penalties, 
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under the belief they are suboptimal.  Excessive fines can harm consumers 
when they cause firms to reduce investments in innovation and raise prices. 
If firms cannot absorb or otherwise pass along the fines as higher prices, 
then the firms either reorganize under the bankruptcy laws or exit the 
market, which as a consequence has fewer meaningful competitors.243  
D.  Scenario IV: Bounded Rational Firms and Consumers 
Under this last scenario, many market participants have bounded 
rationality and willpower.  Biases and heuristics are systemic.  At closer 
inspection, competition under Scenario IV is better viewed as a discovery 
process than a stable equilibrium.  Bounded rational firms have imperfect 
knowledge about current and future consumer preferences, a blurred and 
changing understanding of their goals and preferences, and a limited 
repertoire of actions to cope with whatever problems they face.244  Bounded 
rational consumers have changing and, at times, inconsistent preferences.245  
They, for example, demand more choices than they actually prefer.246  
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Bounded rational firms comply, leading to suboptimal results for 
consumers247 and firms.248 
Scenario IV competition is an “evolutionary trial and error process, in 
which the firms try out different problem solutions and can learn from the 
feedback of the market, which of their specific products and technological 
solutions are the superior ones.”249  Rather than an end-state capable of 
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being perfected, competition is a continuous process “in which previously 
unknown knowledge is generated,” and “the multiplicity and diversity of 
the (parallel trials of the) firms might be crucial for the effectiveness of 
competition as a discovery procedure.”250  Firms and consumers make 
mistakes, readjust, and undertake new strategies.  The competitive process 
“is inherently a process of trial and error with no stable end-state considered 
by the participants in the process.”251 
Scenario IV involves several important competitive dimensions beyond 
price.  First bounded rational firms can compete in the extent they debias 
themselves.252  Firms (like consumers) can improve (or regress) in their 
decision-making and willpower.253  The ways in which companies learn, 
accomplish tasks, and deal with the uncertainty can vary firm-to-firm.254  
Rather than incur costs to continually process information anew, bounded 
rational firms (like consumers) can use rules-of-thumb (heuristics).  Firms 
with better routines and rules-of-thumb can lower their information 
processing costs and secure a competitive advantage.  Firms can improve 
feedback mechanisms to more quickly learn from their (or other firms’) 
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mistakes.255 Moreover, firms can identify common biases and take 
preventive measures.256 
Although an important facet of Scenario IV competition is how firms 
discover and implement routines to gain a cost advantage, bounded rational 
firms risk competency traps, whereby they become wedded to existing 
routines, which as industry conditions change, place them at a competitive 
disadvantage.257  Under Scenario IV, “[i]n some sense knowledge 
depreciates in value over time.”258  Thus another important dimension of 
competition is adaptive efficiency,259 whereby bounded rational firms 
update routines to reflect consumers’ changing preferences.260  Firms 
compete by continually learning about customer preferences and 
competitors’ experimentation, and experimenting themselves with new 
technologies, routines, and ways of organizing.  
A second important dimension of Scenario IV competition is in 
providing bounded rational consumers a better mix of solutions for their 
problems.261  Through their (or monitoring their competitors’) trial-and-
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error experiments, bounded rational firms update product offerings to 
accommodate consumers’ changing preferences.  Their ability depends in 
part on the feedback loop’s efficacy and the competitive behavior’s 
transparency.262  (Alternatively bounded rational firms in Scenario IV (as in 
Scenario II) can seek to mitigate competition by reducing price transparency 
and differentiating their products or services through branding and 
technological innovation.263)   
A third important dimension of Scenario IV competition is the value of 
individuality, creativity, and distinctiveness.  Under Scenario I competition, 
rational individuals are undifferentiated in motivation:  They seek, 
whenever the opportunity, to promote their economic self-interest.  Labor is 
a commodity, an instrument for providing goods and services, which can be 
downsized, outsourced, or automated.264  There is no inherent dignity in 
work or greater social calling to use one’s skills to society’s betterment.  
But as a matter of common experience, the greater value we see our work as 
having, the more meaning we can attribute to our labor, and the more 
engaged and motivated we will be in our work.265  Scenario IV’s theory of 
competition helps explain why firms devote significant resources in 
identifying and attracting talented workers.  It re-introduces moral beliefs of 
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why we work.266  Scenario IV competition enriches our definition of labor, 
namely the opportunity to use one’s unique gifts to improve the welfare of 
others, and thereby express and deepen individual dignity. 
In addition, by inculcating a unique identity, firms can promote (or 
hinder) social, ethical and moral values that affect employee behavior;267 
these values in turn can lower the firm’s monitoring costs and increase its 
competitiveness.268  
Scenario IV competition also presents several risks.  One risk is that 
with bounded rational firms and consumers, traditional forms of market 
failure (such as cartels and monopolies) are likelier in Scenario IV than 
Scenario I.269  The stronger the presumption of rationality, the more likely 
the market will be efficient, the less the governmental concern over the 
sustained exercise of market power in markets characterized with low to 
moderate entry barriers.  Rational consumers often can defeat the exercise 
of market power by switching to lower-cost substitutes offered by rational 
fringe firms or entrants.  But as Scenario III discusses with bounded rational 
firms, entry will not always occur, as rational choice theory predicts.270  
Cartels can be more durable when price-fixers, like the subjects in other 
behavioral experiments, are more trustful and cooperative than rational 
choice theory predicts.271 
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A second risk of Scenario IV competition is new forms of market 
failure.  In competitive markets, firms identify and discover ways to solve 
consumers’ problems.272  But the financial crisis, Professor Stiglitz wrote, 
showed how the subprime mortgage industry worsened, rather than solved, 
borrowers’ problems.273  Their mortgages increased costs and risks for 
consumers while providing the mortgage brokers and lenders greater fees.  
These products increased risk to the institutions that acquired the ensuing 
credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations.274  Among the 
losers in the financial crisis were other supposedly sophisticated investors 
who failed to appreciate these assets’ risks.275  Moreover, these financial 
innovations made speculation easer.276 
A third risk arises from herding.  Herding can be beneficial, as 
consumer’s utility from a product increases when others use the product.277  
But herding can pressure consumers to forego the superior technology for 
the perceived popular one.278 Consumers, at times, are confronted with 
competing, incompatible technologies.  In choosing, the consumer wants 
the technology platform that others will likely choose, as the more popular 
platform (e.g., Windows operating system) will attract more supporting 
complements developed for that platform.279  Each consumer prefers the 
superior technology.  But believing that others will opt for the subpar 
technology, the consumer will choose the subpar technology and contribute 
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to the suboptimal outcome.   
Herding can lead to irrational exuberance (or pessimism) over stocks, 
real estate, and tulips.280  As Scenario II discusses, even rational investors 
can join (and lead) the herd if greater gains can be derived from inflating the 
bubble and exiting before the bubble pops.  Herding can lead to fads, where 
a consumer’s utility from an item (such as a designer bag) depends on who 
else owns the item (either the perceived trend-setters281 or masses282).  
Herding can increase market turmoil.  When the speculative bubble bursts, 
financial institutions can decide to sell similar assets to maintain their target 
leverage ratio, which further depresses the assets’ selling price, prompting 
the sale of even more assets to deleverage.283   
A fourth risk of Scenario IV competition is industry-specific market 
failures.  One example is media bias.  Historically, antitrust was concerned 
about supply-driven media bias.284  Dominant media firms provide 
distorted, self-censored, or biased news coverage that deviates from the 
coverage consumers prefer.  One way to reduce supply-side media bias is to 
increase competition in the marketplace of ideas.  Increasing the number of 
independently-owned competitors limits the media market’s supply-driven bias by 
(i) increasing the likelihood that the media remain independent when governments 
attempt to manipulate the news; (ii) reducing the risk of information being 
suppressed or distorted when news providers have an interest in manipulating 
consumers’ beliefs; and (iii) driving media firms to invest in providing timely and 
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accurate coverage.285  Under Scenario IV, in contrast, more media 
competition can increase, rather than reduce, media bias.  Bounded rational 
consumers can suffer “belief perseverance,” whereby they hold their views 
notwithstanding disconfirming evidence.286  Consumers search for, and 
overvalue, information that favors their pre-existing cultural outlooks; they 
discount, and are reluctant to search for, information that contradicts their 
pre-existing cultural outlooks.287  Bounded rational consumers seek news 
outlets that reinforce their political ideology, and avoid media outlets that 
challenge their beliefs.  These consumers freely trade-off (to different 
degrees) the accuracy of a news source for confirmation of their pre-
existing beliefs.288  Accordingly, Scenario IV competition can increase 
media bias, which consumers demand.289 The marketplace of ideas becomes 
more fragmented. News coverage increasingly targets specific ideological 
or political beliefs.  This in turn deprives “societies of shared information 
and experiences, leaving us less able to discuss issues, less exposed to 
diverse viewpoints, and more inclined to connect primarily, or only, with 
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those with whom we agree.”290  With greater fragmentation of news 
coverage, the danger exists that consumers seek out only those viewpoints 
with which they already agree, making reasoned debate more difficult.  
Thus the greater danger to democracy, under Scenario IV, is not necessarily 
the lack of media competition, but too much competition and the ensuing 
demand-driven media bias.   
1. Scenario IV’s Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is Rational  
 
If the government is relatively more rational than firms and consumers, 
there remains the risk, as in Scenarios II or III, of authoritarianism and 
corporate autocracy.  
The government, even if more rational, is not omniscient.  The 
government can predict how it would react (under rational choice theory).  
But the government cannot necessarily predict how bounded rational firms 
and consumers behave under Scenario IV.291   
One reason why predictions are harder under Scenario IV lies in the 
unpredictability of the non-price dimensions of competition.  
Heterogeneous bounded rational firms can have different degrees of success 
in debiasing, learning and implementing knowledge into developing product 
or process innovations, and responding to uncertainty and consumers’ 
changing tastes.  Competitive dynamics can change in unforeseen ways, as 
bounded rational firms attempt to accommodate and adjust to changing 
consumer preferences.292  The success of those adjustments and 
accommodations, in turn, can depend on further changes by private and 
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public institutions.293 
Our knowledge of future events ranges from ignorance, uncertainty, 
risk, to certainty.  “If the underlying reality of the markets is constantly 
changing, statistical models based on past data will be of limited use, at 
best, in determining what is likely to happen in the future.”294  Economic 
life is an adventure, but not necessarily a roller coaster.  Waking up 
tomorrow, I would not expect the value of the U.S. stock market to lose 
about $1.2 trillion, my employer to close its doors, or my country to default 
on its debt.  But Black Swan events, Nassim Nicholas Taleb describes, carry 
an extreme impact and are outside the realm of regular expectations, 
because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility.  
Despite the events’ outlier status, the bounded rational market participants 
concoct explanations for their occurrence after the fact to make them 
explainable and predictable.295 
Even for non-Black Swan events, like the price of bagels, competition 
can be viewed under Scenarios I and IV.  I expect my bagel shop tomorrow 
to have the same assortment of bagels (plain, onion, poppy seed, etc.) and 
prices as today.  Consumer preferences should not change dramatically 
overnight.  The price, variety, and quality of bagels should not fluctuate 
wildly (e.g., $2 gourmet bagels on Thursday and seventy-cent plain bagels 
on Friday).  But my comfort level decreases when trying to forecast bagel 
prices over a larger geographic area over a longer time period.  The risk 
factors for the bagel industry, according to one public company, include (i) 
changes in general economic conditions and discretionary consumer 
spending, particularly spending for meals prepared away from home, (ii) 
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changes in consumer tastes and preferences, through new diet fads (e.g., 
low-carbohydrate diets) or government regulations (e.g., the prominent 
disclosure of nutritional and calorie information), (iii) food safety and 
reputation for quality, (iv) volatile commodity prices, (v) weather 
conditions (including natural disasters),296 and (vi) a regional or global 
health pandemic, which could severely affect bagel businesses that position 
themselves as a “neighborhood atmosphere” where “people can gather for 
human connection and high quality food.”297  So if bagel manufacturers 
face challenges in predicting and satisfying consumer preferences over the 
coming years, so too will competition authorities when predicting 
competitive effects in that industry. 
Adding to the uncertainty under Scenario IV is path dependency.  
Private and government agents’ prior choices and historical experiences can 
constrain the current choice set.298  A seemingly minor event that happened 
yesterday in the market can have significant long-term consequences.299  
Some industries, like evolutionary processes generally, are characterized by 
a degree of persistence of random events. “Rather than being additive to a 
deterministic equilibrium, small random events in evolutionary processes 
may accumulate into larger factors that may change the nature of the system 
and its history.”300  Under an evolutionary economic process, “chance plays 
a significant role.”301   
One example is the rise of Microsoft.  In the late 1960s, IBM controlled 
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about 70 percent of the computer market.  The DOJ challenged IBM’s 
practices, particularly its “bundling” hardware and software.  During the 
course of antitrust litigation, IBM changed course.  “Precipitated by a 
massive antitrust complaint filed against IBM by the Justice Department in 
January 1969, the company reexamined its practices and decided to stop 
requiring customers to buy software, services, and hardware as one bundle 
in June of the same year.  This pricing change opened up software markets 
to independent companies.”302  This contributed to the development of the 
computer software industry.  A decade later, when preparing to launch its 
personal computers, the still dominant IBM approached a start-up company 
Microsoft about creating a version of a BASIC computer program.  
Microsoft suggested that IBM talk to Digital Research, whose CP/M 
operating system had become the standard for computer hobbyists.  But 
here emotion apparently had a lasting impact.  Digital Research’s president 
reportedly disliked the arrogant IBM from his university days and was late 
in meeting the IBM executives (going flying earlier that day).  After the 
negotiations stalled, IBM returned to Microsoft to create an operating 
system for its personal computer.  When introducing its PC, IBM sold the 
Microsoft operating system for a much lower price than the CP/M-86 
system.303  One could inquire what would have happened if the DOJ never 
brought its antitrust suit against IBM or if Digital Research’s president had 
not gone flying that day. 
Another factor is how randomness interplays with predictability in 
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scale-free networks.304  Scale-free networks are open.  They expand through 
the continuous addition of new members to the system, and they exhibit 
preferential connectivity, “in that the probability with which a new vertex 
connects to the existing vertices is not uniform, but there is a higher 
probability to be linked to a vertex that already has a large number of 
connections.”305  To illustrate this, suppose three antitrust professors--
Amelia, Beatrice, and Clara--start their careers at similar law schools and 
their scholarship objectively is of similar quality.  The three professors form 
links (say collaborate on research projects) with one another.  Their network 
expands with each new antitrust law professor.  Each new antitrust 
professor must decide with which existing antitrust professor to collaborate.  
The new professors exhibit preferential connectivity, in that they generally 
prefer to link with more connected professors.  Thus with Amelia, Beatrice, 
and Clara, the early rounds are more random:  the new antitrust professor 
Daniela can decide to link with Amelia, Beatrice, or Clara.  Suppose 
Daniela randomly decides to collaborate with Amelia and Clara.  Now 
when new antitrust professor Eitel decides to collaborate, Amelia and Clara 
have an advantage over Beatrice.  Thus, Amelia and Clara will grow in the 
number of links, as Beatrice lags behind.  As Professor Barabási observed 
with scale-free networks, the rich get richer.306  The highly connected nodes 
(law professors Amelia and Clara in our example) acquire more links than 
the less connected nodes (e.g., Professor Beatrice), which leads to the 
emergence of a few highly connected nodes that become the main hubs for 
collaboration. Thus, in scale-free networks, one must view the entire 
process.  If one only examines the network half-way through its formation, 
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one might assume that the well-connected antitrust professors were 
attracting more links because they were better scholars.  By then Amelia 
and Clara might be better scholars (due to the experience of collaboration 
and receiving as a result more information of current trends).  But they 
reached that success through an element of luck in the beginning.  Likewise, 
in examining the network only at its formation, one might assume that the 
market was contestable as each professor had an equal chance of attracting 
the next link. 
2. Scenario IV’s Policy Risks Assuming the Government Is Bounded 
Rational 
As in Scenarios II and III, the bounded rational government, 
overconfident in the market participants’ rationality and willpower, may 
assume that market forces generally will yield optimal outcomes.307  Indeed 
regulatory capture is most effective when bounded rational regulators’ 
“share the worldview and the preferences of the industry they supervise.”308  
This was the case with deregulation of the financial services industry, which 
began during the Reagan administration,309 and accelerated under the 
Clinton310 and Bush311 administrations.  One underlying force to this 
deregulatory movement was the flawed laissez-faire belief that markets 
were composed of sophisticated investors, and the markets accordingly 
generally self-correct.312 
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A second policy risk is that the bounded rational government, 
overconfident in its ability to predict the likely competitive effects of 
mergers, has little incentive or desire to assess the predictive quality of its 
economic models.313  Here the government, unlike bounded rational firms, 
fails to recognize that its knowledge depreciates in value over time.  
Competition officials remain wedded to theories, the premises of which are 
by now invalid.  The government, for example, assumes that its economic 
models still capture the key variables and that the market dynamics remain 
largely unchanged since it last investigated the industry.  Antitrust’s 
economic models mostly seek to reduce uncertainty, with the outcomes 
largely based on the validity of the models’ assumptions.  Implicit in much 
of current economic theory is that one can accurately predict the future from 
past experiences (as reflected in the data).314  Over the past two decades, 
antitrust enforcers have increasingly harnessed the increase in available 
market data to conduct merger simulations.315  Generally, with this 
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economic modeling, the narrower the product category and geographic area 
studied, the shorter the time horizon, the less likely that contingencies and 
random factors will play a material role in making outcomes 
indeterminate.316  But one recent survey identified several limitations in the 
current economic models, including the lack of data availability in some 
industries, the assumptions in the models, and the models’ neglect of non-
quantifiable and long-run competitive effects, including the merger’s impact 
on innovation.317  While merger simulations can help inform antitrust 
analysis, the U.S. antitrust agencies wisely “do not treat merger simulation 
evidence as conclusive in itself.”318  With the rise of global trade, we are 
trending toward greater uncertainty, where contingencies or unforeseen 
factors across the globe (e.g., a string of worker suicides in Foxconn’s 
factory in Shenzhen, China) can affect domestic competitors (like Apple) 
that rely on low-cost labor.319 
A third risk under Scenario IV is that the bounded rational government 
ignores non-quantifiable and long-run competitive effects, such as systemic 
risks, and evidence which its economic theory cannot explain, such as 
bounded rational behavior.320  The financial industry during the 1990s and 
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early 2000s underwent a wave of mega-mergers.321  As a DOJ official 
noted, “a number of individual mergers during the 1990's ranked among the 
largest U.S. bank mergers ever, in terms of the real value of assets involved, 
and in terms of the share of total U.S. bank assets accounted for by the 
merging banks.”322 The financial sector was becoming more concentrated, 
and its profits were growing faster.323  One mega-merger in the financial 
services industry was the $70 billion merger of Travelers Group Inc. and 
Citicorp, which created the world’s largest commercial banking 
organization, with total consolidated assets of approximately $751 
billion.324  During its merger review, the DOJ “heard numerous complaints 
that Citigroup would have an undue aggregation of resources—that the deal 
would create a firm too big to be allowed to fail.”325  But the DOJ 
“essentially viewed this as primarily a regulatory issue to be considered by 
the [Federal Reserve Board].”326  Despite the merger wave among large 
financial institutions, the DOJ never really considered systemic risk or how 
creating a firm too big to fail could distort competition.  Instead the DOJ 
limited its risk analysis as to whether Citicorp-Travelers, post-merger, could 
raise price in narrowly defined geographic markets.  So if a dominant bank 
in the western United States merges with a dominant bank in the eastern 
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United States, the merger, in theory, should pose little antitrust risk, as they 
operated in separate geographic markets.327  In limiting its risk assessment 
to short-term price effects (e.g., banks’ ability post-merger to raise rates for 
specific categories of borrowers) in narrowly-defined geographic markets, 
the bounded rational government can fail to see or assess the merger’s 
impact on the efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the overall 
financial system. 
The financial markets, when viewed as a complex adaptive system, can 
become more vulnerable as one bank increases in size and becomes too-big-
to-fail.328  This is not always apparent.  During relatively calm periods, 
having large financial institutions can appear beneficial.  If a peripheral 
bank is subject to a random shock, the network’s health remains stable.  
Indeed, the larger banks may be credited for absorbing the shock.329  “It is 
only when the hub–a large or connected financial institution--is subject to 
stress that network dynamics will be properly unearthed,” said a Bank of 
England executive. “When large financial institutions came under stress 
during this crisis, these adverse system-wide network dynamics revealed 
themselves.”330 
Even if the bounded rational government acknowledges systemic risks, 
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the risks are often harder to quantify and thus easier to ignore.  Under a total 
welfare analysis, the competition authority assesses a merger’s risks (and 
costs) over the short-term (including its impact on consumer and producer 
surplus) and long-term (including its effect on the network’s resilience).331  
Assessing the merger’s short-term static price effects (e.g., whether the 
banks post-merger can raise rates for specific categories of borrowers) is 
often easier than assessing and quantifying the merger’s long-term impact 
on the efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the overall financial 
network.  But if the government ignores the mega-merger’s risks to the 
overall financial network’s resilience, then the merger analysis is 
incomplete and potentially flawed.  This risk is compounded when the 
bounded rational government, overconfident that its merger analysis 
identifies all the significant anticompetitive risks, quickly approves mega-
mergers that are viewed as market extensions (despite the long-term risks 
these mergers may pose), and seeks to dismantle any restraints on future 
industry concentration.332 
A fourth risk under Scenario IV is when a bounded rational government 
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is overconfident in its ability to regulate firms deemed too big to fail.  For 
example, commenters warned the Federal Reserve Board that the Citicorp-
Travelers mega-merger “would result in an undue concentration of 
resources and in an organization that is both ‘too big to fail’ and ‘too big to 
supervise.’”333 But in permitting the merger, the Federal Reserve responded 
the nation’s largest corporate merger “would have a de minimis effect on 
competition.”334  The Federal Reserve rejected the argument that the 
absolute or relative size of Citicorp would adversely affect the market 
structure.335  It failed to see how “the size or breadth of Citicorp's activities 
would allow it to distort or dominate any relevant market.”336  Finally, the 
Federal Reserve, with its “extensive experience supervising Citicorp,” 
confidently stated that it “developed a comprehensive, risk-based 
supervision plan” to effectively monitor Citibank; moreover other 
government agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission, would 
“assist the Board in understanding Citigroup's business and the risk profiles 
of those businesses.”337 
As the merger played out over the next decade, Citigroup senior 
management and the government demonstrated their poor understanding of 
the risk profiles of the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) business.338  In 
2008, Citibank, and other financial institutions considered too-big-to-fail, 
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were (or were perceived to be) failing and received an implicit government 
guarantee.  Citigroup, an early recipient of the government bailout, received 
a $45 billion emergency infusion and $301 billion of government asset 
insurance, which was the largest taxpayer bailout for any U.S. bank.339   
3. Policy Alternatives under Scenario IV 
Given Scenario IV’s competitive dynamics, one could argue that the 
government cannot accurately predict the merger’s likely competitive 
effects.  Accordingly, the government should abstain from predictions and 
challenge only those consummated mergers where significant 
anticompetitive effects have manifested.340  But waiting post-merger for 
anticompetitive effects can foreclose effective relief (one reason why 
Congress facilitated pre-merger review).341 
Moreover bounded rationality differs from ignorance.  At times the 
problems are apparent.  One need not be a Homo Economicus to see 
America’s obesity problem.  A bounded rational government can assist 
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consumers’, firms’ and its own learning processes by improving the 
feedback loop.  The government can disseminate information of market 
participants’ trial-and-error experiments, and assist participants in 
integrating and applying that knowledge.  Advances in telecommunications, 
for example, have helped farmers in India to not only learn the latest crop 
prices but to also increase their yields and efficiencies by learning from 
researchers’ and other farmers’ lessons through trial-and-error.  Farmers use 
cell phones to learn how to use less seed, fuel, and fertilizers, while reaping 
bigger harvests.342 
The government can also opt for structural safeguards to promote 
industry diversity.  On the one hand, systemic risk is not limited to highly 
concentrated markets dominated by firms too big to fail.  Small bounded 
rational banks can similarly ignore their activities’ riskiness.343  Several 
bank failures can have a cascading effect, when banks respond similarly to 
cripple the banking system.344  On the other hand, a larger, more diverse 
pool, while susceptible to herding, “leads to a higher probability that in the 
case of an exogenous shock one of these technologies will provide an 
appropriate solution.”345  Consequently perhaps the best recipe for 
confronting uncertainty and systematic risk is maintaining diversity and 
“institutions that permit trial and error experiments to occur.”346 
Ultimately, the key operating issue under Scenario IV is one of 
institutional design. Do the government institutions have sufficient 
incentives to recognize their bounded rationality, to continually learn and 
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update their beliefs, and to update their policies accordingly?   
One impediment to this trial-and-error feedback loop is the behavioral 
bias of belief perseverance, whereby one holds one’s views notwithstanding 
disconfirming evidence.  Confident in the predictive quality of its 
competition policies, the government may argue that there is no need to 
empirically test whether its predictions are indeed accurate; it also ignores 
or discounts competitive behavior that its economic theories cannot explain.   
A second impediment is incentives.  Bounded rational firms at least 
have an incentive to improve their rationality and willpower when debiasing 
provides a competitive advantage.  The government lacks this incentive.  At 
times competition agencies compete for prestige, resources, and cases (such 
as the FTC and DOJ over mergers).  But inter-agency competition does not 
necessarily increase political accountability that reduces biases and 
heuristics.347  The competition agency may attract dynamic leaders with a 
desire to critically test the economic theory’s assumptions.  But others in 
government may resist diverting funding from immediate prosecutions, 
which provide publicity and justification for existence. The rewards from 
institutional learning accrue over the long-term, often after the political 
appointees leave office.  Moreover, economic experts and lawyers whose 
livelihood depends on rational choice theory (and firms that benefit from 
these antitrust policies) will discourage such empiricism as a waste of time 
and resources.  Consequently market forces will not necessarily provide 
government institutions sufficient incentives to recognize their bounded 
rationality, to continually test their assumptions, to retrospectively examine 
the efficacy of their actions, and to use these findings to update their 
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policies.348 
Consequently, competition agencies need patient gardeners, who 
experiment, monitor, and update the economic theories.  To enable these 
gardeners to tend to antitrust policy, structural mechanisms are needed to 
increase the government’s incentives to debias.  One mechanism is to 
increase the government’s accountability.  This can be done directly, as in 
the E.U., where the European Commission’s inaction (e.g., not enjoining a 
merger) can be challenged in court.  But this assumes that the court will 
strike the right balance in deference.  A second mechanism is to require the 
competition agencies to explain why they did not challenge mergers, subject 
to extended review.349  The competition agency should explain each critical 
assumption it made in determining that the merger was unlikely to lessen 
competition.  This, in turn, can be tested, by requiring the agencies to 
undertake and publish more post-merger reviews.  Moreover, if the agency 
believed that the merger is anticompetitive, but felt based on the evidence it 
would lose in court, the agency should say so. Otherwise the courts and 
Congress will be unaware of the unintended consequences the current case 
law is causing.  At times enforcement actions lead to undesirable outcomes.  
High criminal fines can hamper competition.  Divestitures of assets, as part 
of merger review, may later prove inadequate.  Behavioral remedies may 
unintentionally lead to anticompetitive results.350 By subjecting the 
                                                 
348
 NORTH, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 39, at 68. 
349
 The U.S. competition agencies at times issue closing statements, but the analysis 
can vary considerably. Compare Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning 
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd./P&O Princess Cruises plc and Carnival Corporation/P&O 
Princess Cruises plc, FTC File No. 021 0041 (Oct. 4, 2002), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0210041.shtm, with Statement of the Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Merger of 
Delta Air Lines Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corporation, Oct. 29, 2008, 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-at-963.html. 
350
 For example, making price information public may make collusion easier. See 
Maurice E. Stucke, Evaluating the Risks of Increased Price Transparency, 19 SPG 
ANTITRUST 81 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927417; OECD's Directorate 
16-Sep-11 RECONSIDERING COMPETITION 83 
competition agencies' actions to external review and criticism, such ex post 
review would require greater accountability by those entrusted with 
enforcing the antitrust laws. The government can require its competition 
authorities to periodically commission empirical research to test the 
continuing validity of the assumptions underlying their policies.  The 
government agencies “have the ability to study over time how individuals 
behave in certain settings,”351 which is exactly what the U.K.’s Office of 
Fair Trading is doing with pricing frames.352   
CONCLUSION  
To design better competition policies, we need to understand the limits 
of our current policies.  Thus, as the Chicago School recognized, defining 
competition and the goals of competition law are paramount.  This is 
because “[e]verything else follows from the answer we give.”353 Going 
forward, competition authorities must first reevaluate their theory of 
competition.  As this Article shows, no satisfactory definition of 
competition exists.  Some consider competition as an idealized end state 
(such as static price competition under the economic model of perfect 
competition); others view competition as a dynamic process.  
As this Article shows, any theory of competition will depend on its 
premises.  Altering one set of assumptions (rationality of firms and 
consumers) expands the current theories of competition into the frontiers of 
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Scenarios II, III, and IV.  Altering the assumption of the government’s 
relative rationality adds additional policy concerns.  
One cannot understand competition deductively from the assumption of 
rational market participants with perfect willpower.  Nor can one assume 
that every market is confined to one scenario.  In markets with sophisticated 
participants dealing in homogenous goods where price rather than 
innovation is key, competition can resemble Scenario I.  Other markets can 
resemble Scenario IV, where “competition is a method for solving 
knowledge problems through a trial and error process.”354  Nor are 
industries confined to one scenario.  Industries can originate in Scenario IV 
when uncertainty exists over consumers’ preferences and how the new 
technology benefits consumers.355  Various experimental designs are at play 
until through trial-and-error (or network effects) a dominant design 
emerges.  As the industry matures, consumers and manufacturers 
experiment less, variety decreases, and competition turns more on price.356 
Competition is better understood inductively through empirical 
research.  In analyzing competition under the frontiers of Scenarios II, III, 
and IV, policymakers will see beyond static price competition in narrowly-
defined antitrust markets.  Issues of systemic risk, behavioral exploitation, 
herding behavior, and overconfidence bias will increase in importance.  
Antitrust analysis accordingly will shift from narrowly-defined markets to 
vertical and horizontal competition among larger units, systems, platforms, 
alliances, in which potential competition plays an important analytical role. 
Going forward, there will unlikely be any unifying definition of 
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competition.  Competition, like any complex system, is incompressible, in 
that it is “impossible to account for the system in a manner that is less 
complex than the system itself.”357  Once policymakers relax the premises 
of their theories of competition, they will encounter greater complexity.  
They will increasingly perceive competition as an often unpredictable, 
dynamic process, not easily subject to mathematical modeling. 
One might ask whether defining competition, given the complexities, is 
necessary.  But one cannot understand what goals are achievable from a 
competition policy, unless one better comprehends how competition works.  
And one cannot understand competition, if one relies on a flawed 
assumption of rationality. 
Consequently, the first order is to understand how competition works in 
particular industries and to reevaluate the premises of our theory of 
competition, including the rationality of the market participants and the 
interplay among government institutions and informal social, ethical, and 
moral norms.  Although competition agencies are increasingly sharing 
market studies,358 this remains competition policy’s weakness.359   
In revisiting their theory of competition, including the underlying 
assumptions, competition authorities should look beyond antitrust’s current 
neo-classical economic theories, and consider the developments in several 
inter-disciplinary fields, such as behavioral economics, new institutional 
economics, and evolutionary economics.  The literature can provide a richer 
understanding of the observed marketplace behavior, how consumers 
choose, and additional remedial options, including default options.  
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Ultimately, these interdisciplinary economic theories can improve antitrust 
analysis by helping us understand first what competition is, second what 
competition can achieve for us, and third how competition can promote the 
good life. 
